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Rock, Scissors, Paper: ERISA,
the Bankruptcy Code and State
Exemption Laws for Individual
Retirement Accounts
by
C. Scott Pryor*
Three important bodies of law (ERISA, the Bankruptcy Code and state
laws exempting specified property from execution by judgment creditors)
have on occasion collided in bankruptcy courts. Given the wide but uncer-
tain preemptive reach of ERISA, the results of such a collision have not al-
ways been predictable. Following is a case study arising out of three recent
federal decisions in Virginia attempting to resolve the conflicts created at the
intersection of these strands of law. Each case faced the question of whether
ERISA preempted Virginia's exemption law as it applied to IRAs. While
Virginia's exemption of IRAs is distinctively intertwined with its exemption
of pension plans subject to ERISA, conflict over preemption is not unique to
Virginia. Many other states in some fashion combine exemptions for IRAs
with exemptions for pension plans. Thus lawyers dealing with this legal in-
tersection must command a sophisticated understanding of the highly
nuanced doctrine of ERISA preemption.
In 1974 Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA"),' to protect employees who participate in employer-sponsored
benefit plans. The new statute required increased disclosure and reporting to
plan participants, mandated a level of fiduciary care by those entrusted with
retirement assets and created remedies for participants whose protected ex-
pectations were defeated. 2 Among its myriad provisions, ERISA had two of
particular importance to employees whose financial condition might take a
*Associate Professor of Law, Regent University School of Law. J.D. University of Wisconsin Law
School. I wish to thank Dean Jeffrey Brauch and Regent University for the research grant that helped
make this article possible. Thanks also to William Magee for his expert research assistance and Matthew
Wilkins for his editorial help. Any remaining errors, omissions or oversights are mine.
"ERISA" refers to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended. Most of
ERISA was codified in Title 29 of the United States Code. A significant part of ERISA was also codified
in Title 26 of the United States Code (the Internal Revenue Code).2ERISA § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2003). All references to ERISA shall be to Title 29 of the 2003
edition of the United States Code unless otherwise noted.
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serious turn for the worse: a broadly worded anti-alienation provision
(§ 206(d)(1)) 3 and an even more broadly worded express preemption section(§ 514(a)).4
A few years later comprehensive bankruptcy reform legislation was en-
acted. One purpose of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19785 was to make it
easier for individuals to discharge their debts and obtain the proverbial "fresh
start."6 A corollary to the Bankruptcy Code's fresh start principle was the
creation of an optional system of federal exemptions. 7 Hopes for a truly uni-
form set of exemptions proved chimerical when all but sixteen states exer-
cised their power to opt out of the federal exemptions." Individual debtors in
the opt-out states still retained the right in bankruptcy to claim whatever
exemptions state law allowed.9
In 1979 Virginia, like thirty-three other states, opted out of the federal
exemptions10 but continued to offer its residents a limited range of personal
exemptions." In 1990 the Virginia legislature provided a limited exemption
for Individual Retirement Accounts.' 2 Two factors limited Virginia's initial
exemption for IRAs. First, the exemption was limited to the amount neces-
sary to provide the debtor an annual income of $17,500 at age 65.13 Second,
the statute reduced a debtor's exemption for assets held in an IRA by the
amount of assets held for the debtor's benefit in other retirement plans. 14 In
1999 the Virginia legislature added an unlimited exemption for IRAs except
where an individual also had a pension subject to ERISA. 15 The unlimited
3ERISA § 206(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1056. See text accompanying notes 56-58 infra for discussion of the
breadth of the ERISA anti-alienation provision.4ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
'Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
6S. Rep. No. 95-989, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5862. See also Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 320
(1991) (quoting the "fresh start" language of the legislative history). The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
as amended, has generally been referred to as the Bankruptcy Code. Unless otherwise noted, all references
to Bankruptcy Code shall be to Title 11 of the 2003 edition of the United States Code.
711 U.S.C. § 522.
811 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1). As of the end of 2002, thirty-four states have opted out of the federal exemp-
tions. 4 Colliers on Bankruptcy 522.02[1] n.3 (15th ed. 2002).
911 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A).
'°See VA. CODE ANN. § 34-3.1 (Michie 1996); see also Epperley v. Woodyard (In re Epperley), 4 B.R.
124, 125 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980) ("Virginia, by virtue of § 34-3.1, enacted in 1979, is one of a few states in
the nation that has excluded itself from the exemptions provided in 11 U.S.C. § 522 of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act and consequently, the exemption statutes contained in the Code of Virginia prevail.").
"See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4, -4.1, -7, -8, -9, -13, -17, -18, -19 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 2002).
Title 34 specifically identifies what assets are exempt from the property of the estate in bankruptcy and
the extent of those personal exemptions.
i"VA. CODE ANN. § 34-34 (Michie Supp. 2002).
13VA. CODE ANN. § 34-34(C) (Michie Supp. 2002). Calculation of this limitation is based on an
actuarial table incorporated into the statute.4VA. CODE ANN. § 34-34(F) (Michie Supp. 2002).
i"VA. CODE ANN. § 34-34(H) (Michie Supp. 2002).
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IRA exemption did not entirely supplant the previous limited exemption. In
cases where an individual had both an IRA and a pension, the limited 1990
version of the IRA exemption continued to apply. Depending on which of
these provisions applied, debtors in Virginia could exempt all, some or none
of their IRAs.
In three recent Virginia cases these three bodies of law - ERISA, the
Bankruptcy Code and Virginia's exemption laws - collided. In the first case,
Stephen and Susan Gurry joined other family members in a real estate part-
nership in Massachusetts. 16 Subsequently, the property went into foreclosure
and left the Gurrys facing a deficiency judgment of over $267,000.17 Unable
to work out an arrangement with the foreclosing creditor, they filed a joint
petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Their assets
included retirement benefits in a 401(k) plan' s as well as two IRAs. The
debtors' account balance in the 401(k) plan was $61,000; the value of the
IRAs was about $65,000.
The Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Patterson v. Shumate19 excluded
the Gurrys' 401(k) plan assets from their bankruptcy estate. The Gurrys also
claimed an unlimited exemption in the IRAs under the 1999 amendment to
the Virginia exemption statute. The holder of the deficiency judgment sea-
sonably objected and the Bankruptcy Court sustained the objection, forcing
the Gurrys to integrate their retirement assets and surrender all but $7,500
of their IRAs to the creditors. 20
Barely three months later another bankruptcy court in the same district
construed the Virginia exemption statute not to require integration of ex-
cluded pension assets with IRAs. The debtor, Richard Bissell, thus retained
virtually all of his IRA accounts (about $53,000) even though Bankruptcy
Code § 541(c) allowed him to exclude over $500,000 of pension assets from
his estate.21
This significant difference in result can be attributed to the preemptive
effect of ERISA. The Gurry court had held that ERISA did not preempt the
requirement of the Virginia exemption law to integrate IRAs and pension
16Telephone Interview with Tina M. McMillan, counsel for the Gurrys (September 16, 2002).
17In re Gurry, 253 BR. 406, 409 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2000).
518.R.C. § 401(k). 26 U.S.C. § 401(k). All references to the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) shall be
to the Internal Revenue Code in effect on September 1, 2002 unless otherwise noted.
19504 U.S. 753, 765 (1992) ('[A] debtor's interest in an ERISA-qualified pension plan may be ex-
cluded from the property of the bankruptcy estate pursuant to § 541(c)(2) . .
20Gurry, 253 B.R. at 412.
21In re Bissell, 255 BR. 402 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2000). Integration under § 34-34(C) would have re-
quired Richard Bissell to surrender all of his IRA accounts to the bankruptcy trustee. While the Bissell
opinion does not disclose the debtor's age, the most that anyone would be able to exempt under the
Virginia formula is $143,426.50 ($17,500 times 8.1958, the statutory cost per $1 of benefit at age 65).
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assets. 22 The Bissell court disagreed. In Bissell the court concluded that inte-
gration was preempted by ERISA and construed the exemption statute not
to require it.2I Thus Richard Bissell could take advantage of the 1999 unlim-
ited IRA exemption.
Between Gurry and Bissell, the District Court in Phillips v. Bottoms 24
decided that the savings clause in § 514(d) of ERISA 25 preserved the Vir-
ginia exemption statute from preemption. The court noted that Bankruptcy
Code § 522(b) incorporates state exemption statutes into the federal bank-
ruptcy scheme. Relying on early Supreme Court ERISA precedent, the court
concluded that Virginia's exemption was saved from preemption even if Vir-
ginia's integration formula intruded into the field occupied by ERISA.26
Although the integration formula in Virginia's IRA exemption statute is
unique, many states have IRA exemption provisions that raise the possibility
of ERISA preemption. 27 Most states blend the exemption of both IRAs and
retirement plans subject to ERISA into a single statute. Courts at the bank-
ruptcy level have construed the issue of ERISA preemption in these jurisdic-
tions with varying results.28  Other courts have addressed whether the
savings clause in ERISA § 514(d) protects such a blended statute from
preemption.29
The following questions will be analyzed in the course of this article:
1. Would ERISA § 514(a) preempt a stand-alone state stat-
ute exempting IRAs from creditor process and thus the
bankruptcy estate?
2. In the absence of a state statute exempting IRAs, is there
any means by which an IRA can be preserved for the debtor
in bankruptcy?
3. Would ERISA § 514(a) preempt a blended state statute
exempting both IRAs and retirement plans subject to
ERISA?
22Gurry, 253 B.R. at 412 ("While the statute cannot limit or burden the protections afforded by
ERISA, it can protect, to what ever extent the state deems appropriate, retirement plans that do not come
within ERISA's scope, such as individual retirement accounts").
2 Bissell, 255 B.R. at 420-21 ("[T]he creditor's first proposition, that ERISA-qualified plans are retire-
ment plans within the statutory definition in § 34-34(A), cannot be accepted. To hold otherwise would
necessarily void § 34-34 by virtue of federal pre-emption.").
24260 B.R. 393 (E.D. Va. 2000).
25ERISA § 514(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d). Section 514(d) is commonly known as the ERISA "savings
clause." See infra text accompanying notes 70 and 254-62 for further discussion of ERISA's savings clause.
26See infra text accompanying notes 252-66. Since Bottoms, a second district court has concurred in its
savings clause analysis. See Abbate v. Spear, 289 B.R. 62 (E.D. Va. 2003).
27See infra Appendix for a tabulation and analysis of the relevant exemption laws of other states.
28See infra text accompanying notes 285-88 for discussion of ERISA preemption of exemptions.
2
'See infra text accompanying notes 254-56.
(Vol. 77
ROCK, SCISSORS, PAPER
4. Would ERISA § 514(a) preempt a state statute integrat-
ing the amount of the exemption for IRAs with the amount
of assets in retirement plans subject to ERISA?
5. If the answer to any of these questions were yes, would
§ 514(d) save such a state statute from preemption?
Part I of this article briefly reviews the history of ERISA, its structure,
certain important provisions and the related sections of the Internal Revenue
Code affecting pension trusts and IRAs. Part II addresses the history of
bankruptcy law and ERISA with particular attention to the impact of the
Bankruptcy Code on retirement benefits subject to ERISA. Part II also ex-
plores the property of the estate as defined by § 541(c) and the Bankruptcy
Code's reinforcement of federalism in the context of exemptions. Part III
examines alternatives to the Bankruptcy Code as a means by which to ex-
clude IRAs from a debtor's estate, especially state spendthrift trust law. In
Part IV the variegated history of the Supreme Court's handling of ERISA
preemption comes in for sustained scrutiny. This part challenges the conven-
tional wisdom (and vestigial Supreme Court language) that a mere reference
to ERISA in a state statute results in automatic preemption. Part V reviews
in detail the competing decisions addressing Virginia's exemption statute.
Part VI concludes by summarizing the results of preemption challenges to
exemption laws of states other than Virginia. Part VI also addresses the
significance of the savings clause in connection with the Bankruptcy Code's
incorporation of state law exemptions that might otherwise be preempted.
Finally I conclude that ERISA should not be read to preempt state laws that
create or limit exemptions for IRAs, even where the extent of the exemption
for IRAs is integrated with assets within the scope of ERISA - in the end,
Richard Bissell's creditors should have received his IRAs.30
I. A VERY BRIEF ERISA PRIMER
Since its enactment in 1974, ERISA has been the subject of at least 1250
journal articles and other legal publications. 31 An analysis of the full range of
ERISA is not necessary for the purposes of this article. Yet an understanding
of its raison d'tre, relevant portions of its legislative history and several spe-
cific sections are important to set the stage for whether IRA exemption stat-
utes that also refer to ERISA should be preempted.
A. HISTORY AND PURPOSES OF ERISA
Congress wished to encourage the growth of pension plans and to protect
30That is, as a matter of Virginia law, not necessarily as a matter of normative principle.
31A Westlaw search under article titles using TI(erisa) or TI('employee retirement income security")
in the journals and law reviews (JLR) database on May 21, 2003 produced 1288 hits.
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participants in and beneficiaries of such plans when it enacted ERISA.32 ER-
ISA aimed to ensure that participating employees received their benefits and
were allowed to participate after fewer years of service. 33 Congress believed
it was important to mandate uniform federal treatment of employee benefit
plans. 34 The Supreme Court recognized the explicit goal of federal uniform-
ity in Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne.35 The Court noted that employers
that make commitments to provide a wide variety of benefits would find that
"[t]he most efficient way to meet these responsibilities is to establish a uni-
form administrative scheme, which provides a set of standard procedures to
guide processing of claims and disbursement of benefits." 36 Without federally
32See generally ERISA § 2, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1001a and 1001b. ERISA was not the first federal
statute to address employee benefits. The Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 recognized the exis,
tence of trusts for the benefit of employees when it exempted payments to trusts from the broad prohibi-
tion of payments by employers to agents of employees designed to affect collective bargaining
arrangements. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1947). The Internal Revenue Code has included provisions permit-
ting deductions for pension and welfare plan contributions since 1928. See Revenue Act of 1928, Pub. L.
No. 70,562, 45 Stat. 791. During the Eisenhower administration, Congress passed more comprehensive
legislation designed to provide disclosure to beneficiaries of both welfare and pension plans and to regulate
the conduct of plan administrators - the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act ("WPPDA"). See
generally the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act ("WPPDA"), P.L. 85-835 (1958), repealed by
ERISA § 111, 29 U.S.C. § 1031. For a more complete explanation for the enactment of ERISA see
Michael S. Gordon, Overview: Why Was ERISA Enacted?, in PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
LAW 73, 75 (John H. Langbein & Bruce A. Wolk, 2000) [hereinafter Why Was ERISA Enacted?].
33In one of its earliest opinions dealing with ERISA preemption, the Supreme Court noted that Con-
gress designed ERISA to prescribe minimum vesting standards, minimum rules for employee participation,
funding standards (to increase plan solvency), fiduciary standards for plan managers, and an insurance
program to safeguard the expectations of plan participants in the event of the termination of an un,
derfunded plan. Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 510 (1981). See generally H.R. REP.
No. 93-533 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4642, 4647-4648. In addition to making the
benefits of current plans more certain, Congress also wanted the private sector to increase the number of
employees who could participate as well as the range of benefits they could receive. See, e.g., Statement of
Senator Lloyd Bentsen on introduction of S. 1179: "The Federal Government should take action to en-
courage broader coverage under private pension plans and insure receipt of benefits by workers and their
survivors." 119 CONG. REc. 7420 (1973).
34 When drafting ERISA, its congressional authors recognized that the most efficient
way to meet these responsibilities was to establish a uniform, federal, administrative
scheme, providing a set of standard procedures to guide administrators of plans,
processing of claims, and disbursement of benefits. This was particularly true in the
case of plans covering employees or beneficiaries in many different states .... [T]he
inefficiencies in plan operation caused by such "patchwork" regulation might lead
multi-state employers with existing plans to reduce benefits, and those without
such plans to refrain from adopting them.
Howard Shapiro et al, ERISA Preemption: To Infinity and Beyond and Back Again? (A Historical Review
of Supreme Court Jurisprudence), 58 LA. L. REv. 997, 999 (1998). Both the House and Senate floor
managers of ERISA made comments regarding the importance of uniformity of treatment. See, e.g., the
comments of Rep. John Dent (120 CONG. REC. 29,197 (1974)) and Sen. Harrison Williams (120 CONG.
Rsc. 29,993 (1974)).
35482 U.S. 1 (1987).
6Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 9.
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mandated uniformity, Congress feared that employers would face state-gener-
ated multiformity. 37 Fear of the additional expense that multiformity would
generate led Congress to preempt state laws.
B. BASIC ERISA STRUCTURE
ERISA in its original form was divided among five lengthy titles. The
first two - "Protection of Employee Benefit Rights" and 'Amendments to the
Internal Revenue Code" - are particularly significant to this article.38 Both
Titles I and II are relevant to the question of ERISA preemption of state
exemption laws because they are redundant on many matters such as funding
and vesting. Congress enacted Title II separately because it amended the
Internal Revenue Code for tax qualification purposes.39
C. ERISA PREEMPTION AND THE ANTI-ALIENATION PROVISION
Two sections of ERISA stand out in connection with preemption of state
law exemptions. The first is § 514(a), ERISA's express preemption
provision:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the pro-
visions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter
shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may
now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan de-
scribed in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under
section 1003(b) of this title.4°
The express ERISA preemption clause was a deliberate and significant
change from prior law. 41 The principal movers of ERISA wanted to foreclose
state action in at least the areas addressed by ERISA.42 Senator Harrison
37Id. ("Such a system is difficult to achieve, however, if a benefit plan is subject to differing regulatory
requirements in differing States.").
3STitle I in turn was originally divided among five parts, only two of which will come in for sustained
discussion: Part 2 (Participation and Vesting) and Part 5 (Administration and Enforcement). Part 6
("Continuation Health Coverage") was added to Title I of ERISA in 1985 as 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1168.
Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 (1985), Title X.
'
9Congress has continued to tinker with Title II to create more tax-qualified retirement devices and
change limits on existing ones so references will need to be made to both Title I of ERISA and the tax
code. See, e.g., the Revenue Act of 1978 (creating the SEP-IRA), Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Star. 2763
(1978).
4
°ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). The preemption section falls within Title 1, Part 5 of
ERISA.
4iFar from preempting state law, the WPPDA expressly invited additional state regulation of em-
ployee benefit plans. Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1958), § 10(a) (*Nothing contained in this subsec-
tion shall be construed to prevent any State from obtaining such additional information relating to any
such plan as it may desire, or from otherwise regulating such plan."). See Malone v. White Motor Corp.,
435 U.S. 497 (1978).4 2The preemption provision in the final version of ERISA was broader than that in the earlier ver-
sions. See generally Leon E. Irish & Harrison J. Cohen, ERISA Preemption: Judicial Flexibility and Statutory
2003)
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Williams, the floor manager for the bill that became ERISA commented that
it should "preempt the field for Federal regulations, thus eliminating the
threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee
benefit plans. This principle is intended to apply in its broadest sense to all
actions of State or local governments ... which have the force or effect of
law."4 3 The Chairman of the House General Labor Subcommittee, Represen-
tative John Dent, was just as clear, depicting the preemption clause as "the
reservation to Federal authority of the sole power to regulate the field of
employee benefit plans."44 Still it is unlikely that Congress conceived of pre-
emption as a goal independent of the purposes of ERISA. It was the growth
of pension plan assets, the increase in the number of participants in such plans
and the dangers of unfair treatment of the participants that prompted
ERISA.45
The ERISA anti-alienation provision is also particularly significant to the
issue of preemption of exemptions.46 ERISA § 206(d)(1) provides that
"[e]ach pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may
not be assigned or alienated." The limitation of ERISA's anti-alienation
clause to benefits of pension plans is significant. 47 According to the Supreme
Court in Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc.,48 Congress's
disparate treatment of pension and welfare benefits evidenced an intent to
Rigidity, 19 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 109, 112 (1985) [hereinafter ERISA Preemption]. In fact, the Senate
Report concerning the original bill described the original scope of preemption in much narrower terms:
Because of the interstate character of employee benefit plans, the Committee be-
lieves it is essential to provide for a uniform source of law in the areas of vesting,
funding, insurance and portability standards, for evaluating fiduciary conduct, and
for creating a single reporting and disclosure system in lieu of burdensome multiple
reports.
S. Rep. 93-127, at 35 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CA.N. 4838 and 4871.
The reasons for the subsequent broadening of the scope of ERISA preemption are a matter of some debate.
In any event, the final version represents "the most expansive preemption clause Congress considered
while drafting ERISA." ERISA Preemption at 112.
41120 CONG. REC. 29,933 (1974). See also New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 657 ('The basic thrust of the pre-emption clause, then, was to avoid a
multiplicity of regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform administration of employee benefit
plans.")
14120 CONG. REc. 29,197 (1974).
45David T. Shapiro, Note, The Remission of ERISA Preemption: An Examination of Blue Cross/Blue
Shield v. Travelers Ins. Co., 28 CONN. L. REV. 917, 945-46 (1996) ("[B]road preemption was not an
objective itself, but rather, a mechanism to effectuate the prevailing goals of the legislation: to protect plan
participants and to provide plans with national operating standards.").
46The anti-alienation sections appear twice because they serve to qualify plans for both the Depart-
ment of Labor and tax purposes. Compare 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13) with 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
47According to ERISA, a "pension plan" includes profit-sharing plans, 401(k) plans, money purchase
pension plans, target benefit plans, defined benefit plans, Keogh plans (of any of these types), and stock
bonus plans. See generally ERISA § 3(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A).
48486 U.S. 825 (1988).
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protect only the former a9 The Conference Committee Report concerning
what was to become § 206(d)(1) demonstrates concern only for pension
plans. 50 In other words, ERISA was not intended to curb judgment credi-
tors' rights under state law, if any, to reach welfare benefits such as vacation
pay that employees could voluntarily use over the course of the next year.
Conversely, employees who have very limited rights to reach their pension
assets directly should not see their creditors seize the same assets indirectly. 51
The Supreme Court also relied on ERISA § 206(d)(1) to exclude pension
assets from an individual's bankruptcy estate in Patterson v. Shumate.52 But
IRAs are not directly covered by ERISA.53 Individual retirement accounts
were created under IRC § 40854 and do not fit the definition of "employee
benefit plan." Individual retirement accounts should therefore not be pro-
tected by ERISA § 206(d)(1). On the one hand, omission of IRAs from ER-
ISA's antialienation provision provides the impulse for the states to protect
49 [T]here is no ignoring the fact that, when Congress was adopting ERISA, it had
before it a provision to bar the alienation or garnishment of ERISA plan benefits,
and chose to impose that limitation only with respect to ERISA pension benefit
plans, and not ERISA welfare benefit plans .... Congress' decision to remain silent
concerning ERISA welfare plan benefits "acknowledged and accepted the practice
[of garnishment of welfare plan benefits], rather than prohibiting it."
Id. at 837 (emphasis in the original).
50 Under the conference substitute, a plan must provide that benefits under the plan
may not be assigned or alienated. However, the plan may provide that after a
- benefit is in pay status, there may be a voluntary revocable assignment (not to
exceed 10 percent of any benefit payment) by an employee which is not for pur-
poses of defraying the administrative costs of the plan. For purposes of this rule, a
garnishment of levy is not to be considered a voluntary assignment. Vested bene-
fits may be used as collateral for reasonable loans from a plan...
120 CONG. REC. 27,849, 27,920 (1974) reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY.
Si The congressional conference report on ERISA ascribes no stated purpose to the
antialienation rule, doubtless on the ground that the purpose is too obvious for
words. The antialienation rule is protective. It prevents the participant from doing
indirectly what most plans forbid directly, namely, spending retirement savings
before retirement. It would scarcely make sense to stop the participant from draw-
ing down his or her pension account for current consumption if the participant's
creditor could present the bills arising from the participant's consumption spree to
the pension plan by way of assignment or in the form of a judgment debt.
John H. Langbein and Bruce A. Wolk, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAw 575 (3rd ed. 2000).
2
'The antialienation provision required for ERISA qualification and contained in the Plan at issue in
this case thus constitutes an enforceable transfer restriction for purposes of [Bankruptcy Code]
§ 541(c)(2)'s exclusion of property from the bankruptcy estate." Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. at 760.
53ERISA § 201(6) provides that Part 2 of Title I does not apply to IRAs. 29 U.S.C. § 1051(6). IRAs
are simply taxadvantaged savings accounts. Conversely, ERISA § 3(2) considers 401(k) plans to be "pen-
sion benefit plans" even though such plans are also little more than tax-advantaged savings (or mutual
fund) accounts.
5426 U.S.C. § 408.
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this form of retirement savings through exemptions. 55 On the other, IRAs
are also free from ERISA's preemption provision thus permitting states to
enact a stand-alone exemption for them.
1. Would ERISA § 514(a) preempt a stand-
alone state statute exempting IRAs from
creditor process and thus the bankruptcy
estate?
II. ERISA AND BANKRUPTCY LAW
In 1992 a unanimous Supreme Court held in Patterson v. Shumate that
Bankruptcy Code § 54 1(c)(2) 56 excluded the assets of an "ERISA-qualified"57
pension account from a debtor's bankruptcy estate. The Court's reasoning
was straightforward: ERISA § 206(d)(1) made certain pension assets inalien-
able and the Bankruptcy Code's definition of 'property of the estate" ex-
cluded assets subject to such a legal restriction.58 Several questions remained
open even after the Court's decision: which pension accounts could be 'ER-
ISA-qualified" and which, if any, of the Bankruptcy Code's exemption provi-
sions would reach pension accounts that were not "ERISA-qualified."
A. ERISA QUALIFICATION AND IRAs
Professor Donna Litman has written the definitive piece on the lower courts'
application of Patterson v. Shumate to pension plans in bankruptcy cases.59
The comments that follow will largely be drawn from her work. Professor
Litman notes, as have many others,60 that there is no statutory definition for
the Supreme Court's phrase "ERISA qualified pension plan."61 The plan in
"See infra Table reproduced as Appendix I.
"A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under
applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this title." 11 U.S.C. § 541(C)(2).
17See infra text accompanying notes 59-63 for discussion of the "ERISA-qualified" misnomer.
5Spatterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. at 760.
'Donna Litman, Bankruptcy Status of'ERISA Qualified Pension Plans" - An Epilogue to Patterson v.
Shumate, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV 637 (2001) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Status].
'See, e.g., Jack E. Karns, ERISA Qualified Pension Plan Benefits As Property of the Bankruptcy Estate:
The Unanswered Questions After Patterson v. Shumate, 16 CAMPBELL L. REV. 303, 304 (1994); Anthony
Michael Sabino and John P. Clarke, The Last Line of Defense: The New Test for Protecting Retirement
Plans From Creditors in Bankruptcy Cases, 48 ALA. L. REV. 613, 628 n. 84 (1997); Amy Elizabeth Dahl,
Comment, Bankruptcy- The Estate: The District Court for North Dakota Determines the Requisite Ele-
ments in Order for an Employee Benefits Plan to be ErisaQualified and Excluded from the Bankruptcy
Estate: In re Craig, 204 BR. 756 (D.N.D. 1997), 74 N.D. L. REV. 119, 127 (1998); Mary Ann Jackson,
Note, Patterson v. Shumate: What Happens to Pension Benefits in Bankruptcy?, 47 ARK L. REV. 449, 472
(1994).
6'Bankruptcy Status, supra note 59, at 643 ("The term, 'ERISA qualified pension plan' is not a term
that is defined by ERISA nor is it a term that is defined by the Internal Revenue Code.").
(Vol. 77
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Patterson v. Shumate met all conceivable criteria for ERISA qualification: it
.was subject to title I of ERISA, was qualified under section 401 of the
Internal Revenue Code, and contained the antialienation provision required
by the labor and tax sections of ERISA."62 Professor Litman goes on to
demonstrate how courts have dealt with plans that failed to meet the various
permutations of these requirements.63
Individual retirement accounts (and annuities) necessarily fail to meet the
first two of the criteria for ERISA qualification. Part 2 of Title I of ERISA
(which contains ERISA's anti-alienation provision) specifically excludes IRAs
from its coverage. 64 In fact, IRAs do not fall within the scope of Title I of
ERISA generally. 65 Nor are IRAs qualified under section 401 of the Internal
Revenue Code. Rather, IRAs find their origin in the tax code in sections
408(a) and (b).6 6 While IRAs could contain an anti-alienation provision,
nothing in ERISA requires that they do so.67 Numerous courts have thus
62Id. at 644.
63According to Professor Litman, "a plan that is subject to title I of ERISA, and in particular, section
206 (d)(1), should be excludible under section 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code... regardless of whether
the plan contains a trust that is qualified under the Internal Revenue Code." Id. at 698-99. Even if the
plan for some reason does not contain the required anti-alienation provision, "it is arguable that an interest
in such [a] plan still should be excludible from the bankruptcy estate . . ." Id. at 699. Patterson v. Shumate
does not protect plans that are statutorily exempt from Title I of ERISA. Plans that are administratively
exempt from Title I of ERISA should be excluded under § 541(c)(2) but only if "the plan contains the
necessary plan restriction [i.e., an anti-alienation provision] to satisfy this qualification requirement [IRC
§ 401(a)(13)]." Id. at 700.
64 This part shall apply to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of
this title (and not exempted under section 1003(b)) other than -
(6) an individual retirement account or annuity described in section 408 of the
Internal Revenue code of 1986...
ERISA § 201(6), 29 U.S.C. § 1051(6).65Title I of ERISA applies to 'employee welfare benefit plans" and 'employee pension benefit plans."
ERISA §§ 3(1) and 3(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1) and 1002(2)(A). The definition of 'pension plan"
requires that an employer or an employee organization establish it. Id. Individual retirement accounts are,
as their name suggests, established by individuals.
6626 U.S.C. § 408(a) and (b). The Eleventh Circuit has defined an IRA
[A]s a personal tax deferred, retirement account which an employed person can
establish under specified deposit limits for individuals and married couples. With-
drawals may be made from an IRA prior to age 591/2 but such withdrawals are
subject to a ten percent penalty tax. An IRA is neither established nor maintained
by an employer or employee organization. Instead, an IRA is maintained by an
individual in accordance with the restrictions contained in 26 U.S.C. § 408.
Meehan v. Wallace (In re Meehan), 102 F.3d 1209, 1210 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Herbert, 140
B.R. 174, 176 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992)).6 7Bankruptcy Status, supra note 59 at 700 ("An individual retirement account is not governed by
section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code, and thus, it is not required by section 401(a)(13) of the Internal
Revenue Code to provide that plan benefits may not be assigned or alienated."). Similar results are ob-
tained with respect to simplified employee pensions ("SEPs") that exist by virtue of IRC § 408(k). Even
though employers contribute to SEPs, the contributions are to the employee's IRA, not a trust subject to
ERISA. IRC § 408(k)(1), 26 U.S.C. § 408(k)(1). Savings incentive match plans for employers ("SIMPLE
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correctly held that IRAs are not excluded from the bankruptcy estate.68 In-
dividual retirement accounts are thus disadvantaged compared to other forms
of retirement assets in bankruptcy. Funds held for retirement in a trust sub-
ject to ERISA are excluded from the estate regardless of the dollar amount of
debtor's interest in such trusts. Funds held in an IRA are protected, if at all,
only if covered by a federal or state exemption.
B. BANKRUPTCY CODE EXEMPTIONS AND IRAs
Three additional sources of law may protect IRAs in the event of the bank-
ruptcy of the account (or annuity) owner: federal exemption laws, state ex-
emptions or state common law. The first two sources have ERISA
implications, albeit for different reasons. If applicable to an IRA, a federal
exemption would certainly not run afoul of ERISA preemption.69 ERISA
§ 514(d) might even reinforce the validity of such an exemption?70 On the
other hand, state efforts at exempting IRAs could run into a zone of preemp-
tion.71 Finally, the common law of spendthrift trusts may succeed in exclud-
ing retirement assets under Bankruptcy Code § 541(c)(2) but is unlikely to
benefit owners of IRAs.72
Two subsections of Bankruptcy Code § 522 are relevant to the exemp-
tion of retirement assets. Section 522(d)(10)(E) - applicable only in non-opt-
out states - permits the exemption of a limited amount of a debtor's right to
receive retirement benefits so long as the benefits arise from tax-qualified
pension plans, annuity plans sponsored by educational institutions or IRAs. 73
The federal exemption for retirement assets applies broadly, including to
plans") created under IRC § 408(p) present a more difficult question. Employer contributions are gener-
ally made to the employee's IRA but SIMPLE plans may also be formed as a pension plan subject to
ERISA. If contributions were to an IRA, there would be no exclusion under Bankruptcy Code
§ 541(c)(2). If the contributions are to a trust that contains an anti-alienation clause, the assets might be
excluded. See generally Alson R. Martin, Creditos' and DebtoTs' Rights in Retirement Benefits: Develop-
ments in the Post-Patterson v. Shumate Era, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS SF69,
February 2001.6SSee, e.g., Velis v. Kardanis, 949 F.2d 78, 82 (3d Cir. 1991); Hermes v. Ribitwer (In re Hermes), 239
B.R. 491, 493 (E.D. Mich. 1999); Dionne v. Harless (In re Harless), 187 B.R. 719, 726 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.
1995); Eisenberg v. Houck (In re Houck), 181 B.R. 187, 193 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995); In re Ree, 114 BR.
286, 289 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990).69 ERISA § 514(a) is directed only to state laws. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).70ERISA § 514(d) specifically saves all federal laws from supersession. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d). See infra
note 254.
7iSee supra text accompanying note 67 and infra text accompanying note 288 for analysis of this issue.
72See infra text accompanying notes 105-06 for analysis of this issue.
73 (d) The following property may be exempted under subsection (b)(1) of this section:
The debtor's right to receive -
(E) a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar plan
or contract on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service, to the
extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the
debtor, unless -
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funds held in IRAs.74 Section 522(d)(10)(E) is, however, limited to payments
reasonably necessary" for support of the debtor and any dependent of the
debtor.75 Because thirty-four states have opted out of the federal exemptions,
this provision is of limited significance.76 Congressional authorization for
states to opt out of the federal exemptions carries it own consequences. Con-
gress's express sanction of states' elimination of federal exemptions, and its
explicit permission for debtors to use state exemptions, raises the question of
whether such state exemptions are saved from preemption by ERISA
§514(d).77
The second relevant subsection, Bankruptcy Code § 522(b)(2)(A), ap-
plies to all individual debtors, whether in states allowing the use of federal
exemptions or states that have opted out. This provision permits all debtors
to exempt property exempt under federal nonbankruptcy law.78 Before the
Supreme Court's decision in Patterson v. Shumate, several courts considered
whether ERISA's anti-alienation clause amounted to such an exemption and
came to differing conclusions. 79 The Court's decision in Patterson v. Shumate
(iii) such plan or contract does not qualify under section 401(a), 403(a), 403(b), or
408 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E).
74 Some courts have questioned whether IRAs must necessarily be considered sufficiently 'similar" to a
stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, [or] annuity" within the meaning of Bankruptcy Code § 522(d)(10).
See, e.g., Rousey v. Jacoway (In re Rousey), 283 B.R. 265, 272 (B.A.P 8th Cir. 2002) ("Contrary to the
interpretation given by some courts, there is nothing explicit within the Bankruptcy Code, the legislative
history, or 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) itself which manifests Congressional intent to exempt IRA retire-
ment plans in toto."). The weight of authority, however, has reached the contrary conclusion. Carmichael
v. Osherow (In re Carmichael), 100 F.3d 375, 377-78 (5th Cir. 1996) ('An IRA is not a stock bonus,
pension, profit-sharing, or annuity plan or contract; therefore, to qualify for the exemption, an IRA must
be a 'similar plan or contract.' We hold that for purposes of § 522(d)(10)(E), an IRA is a 'similar plan or
contract.'"); Rawlinson v. Kendall (In re Rawlinson), 209 B.R. 501, 504 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997) ("By analo-
gizing the treatment of IRAs to Congress' treatment of other retirement plans in § 522(d)(10)(E), we find
it more than plausible to infer that Congress intended for IRAs to be treated similarly for purposes of
exemption."). For an account of why IRAs should not automatically be treated as exempt retirement plans
under Bankruptcy Code § 522(d)(10)(E), see Patricia E. Dilley, Hidden in Plain View: The Pension Shield
Against Creditors, 74 IND. L.J. 355, 367 (1999) [hereinafter The Pension Shield].
"The "reasonably necessary" limitation on the Federal exemption to retirement assets will be elimi-
nated if the bankruptcy reform legislation pending in the 107th Congress passes. See Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 2001, H.R. 333, 107th Cong. § 224 (2001). If this legislation becomes law, then the exemption for
property held in IRAs would become absolute in states that have not opted out of the federal system.
76See infra note 8.
77ERISA § 514(d). See infra text accompanying notes 41-43 for analysis of this issue.
78 Notwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individual debtor may exempt from
property of the estate the property listed in either paragraph (1) or, in the alterna-
tive, paragraph (2) of this subsection .... Such property is -
(2)(A) any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than subsection (d) of
this section ...
11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A).
79See, e.g., In re Suarez, 127 BR. 73 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991) (holding that ERISA qualified as "'other
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rendered the question moot: ERISA's anti-alienation provisions do not create
an exemption; they operate to exclude the retirement assets from the estate.8 0
Because IRAs are not subject to ERISA's anti-alienation provisions, this sec-
tion of the Bankruptcy Code is of no utility for debtors who own them.
Whatever the precise parameters of the phrase "ERISA-qualified," it
should not include IRAs. ERISA qualification may include as many as three
factors8' or perhaps as few as two.8 2 In either event, an IRA fails to qualify:
it is not subject to Title I of ERISA and an IRA's tax advantages arise under
IRC § 408, not IRC § 401. If the debtor's state has not opted out of the
federal bankruptcy exemptions then a debtor's IRA may be exempt to the
extent its proceeds are reasonably necessary for support. There is no danger
of ERISA preemption in non-opt-out states because the ERISA savings
clause preserves other federal statutes from preemption. If the debtor's state
has opted out of the federal exemptions, however, then even the reservation
of nonbankruptcy federal exemptions will be of no avail because ERISA's
anti-alienation provision does not apply to IRAs.
III. STATE SPENDTHRIFT TRUST LAW AND BANKRUPTCY
Qualification as a spendthrift trust under state law represents the final
means by which retirement assets could be excluded from the bankruptcy
estate without danger of ERISA preemption. Section 70a(5) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898 worked to exclude the spendthrift beneficiary's interests
from the trustee's reach.8 3 Congress intended Bankruptcy Code § 541(c)(2)
to accomplish the same result.8 4 Numerous decisions have applied this rule to
exclude the beneficial interests of a debtor in a spendthrift trust from the
federal law' within the meaning of Bankruptcy Code § 522(b)(2)(A)"). Accord In re Komet, 104 B.R. 799
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989). Contra In re Daniel, 771 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1985) (anti-alienation provisions
of ERISA and IRC did not create federal non-bankruptcy exemptions) and Samore v. Graham (In re
Graham), 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984).
"'See supra text accompanying notes 52-58 for discussion of this issue.
"
1The threefactor test requires that (1) the plan be subject to Title I of ERISA, (2) the trust holding
the retirement assets be qualified for tax purposes under IRC § 401, and (3) the trust contain an anti-
alienation provision. See Bankruptcy Status, supra note 59, at 652.
"
2The two-factor test omits the requirement of tax qualification. Id. See, e.g., In re Hanes, 162 B.R.
733, 740 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1994).
83 Whether such an interest in property passes to the trustee in bankruptcy and is
subject to sale by him depends upon whether it is "property which prior to the
filing of the petition he (the bankrupt) could by any means have transferred or
which might have been levied upon and sold under judicial process against him"
Bankruptcy Act § 70a(5), 11 USCA § 110(a)(5) ... We think it clear that under
the law of Maryland the interest of bankrupt in the trust estate created by the will
is not such as he could have transferred or as could have been subjected to sale for
payment of his debts.
Suskin & Berry, Inc. v. Rumley, 37 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1930) (citations omitted).
s4"Paragraph (2) of subsection (c) ... preserves restrictions on transfer of a spendthrift trust to the
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bankruptcy estate.8 5
A. IRAs, THE IRC AND STATE TRUST LAW
Considering spendthrift trust law in connection with IRAs may seem absurd.
After all, Bankruptcy Code § 541(c)(2) limits its application to the "benefi-
cial interest of the debtor in a trust" and an employer or an employee organi-
zation does not maintain IRAs; they are tax-favored savings accounts owned
by an individual - not trusts.86 Yet one subsection of the Internal Revenue
Code describes an IRA as a trust.87 Based on this provision the Eleventh
Circuit has suggested in dicta that IRC § 408(a) may effectively render IRAs
as trusts, regardless of whether state law would reach the same result. 88
While the Third Circuit raised the same issue in an opinion, it declined to
provide an answer because the bankruptcy trustee failed to argue that IRAs
could not be trusts.89
extent that the restriction is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law." H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at
369 (1977).
S5 See, eg., Taunt v. Gen. Retirement Sys. (In re Wilcox), 233 F.3d 899 (6th Cir. 2000); Cisneros v.
Kim (In re Kim), 257 BR. 680 (B.A.P 6th Cir. 2000); Drewes v. Schonteich, 31 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1994);
In re Barnes, 264 B.R. 415 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2001); Carrell v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 119 BR. 170 (Bankr.
N.D. Iowa 1990).
S6See Meehan v. Wallace (In re Meehan), 102 F.3d 1209, 1210 (lth Cir. 1997). Some courts have
concluded that Bankruptcy Code § 541(c)(2)'s limitation to trusts may be relaxed in the ERISA context.
See, e.g., Arkison v. UPS Thrift Plan (In re Rueter), 11 F.3d 850, 852 (9th Cir. 1993).
87-(a) Individual retirement account. For purposes of this section, the term 'individual retirement ac-
count' means a trust created or organized in the United States for the exclusive benefit of an individual or
his beneficiaries .. .' 26 U.S.C. § 408(a). Individual retirement annuities do not have the designation of a
trust. See 26 U.S.C. § 408(b).
88 Apparently only beneficial interests in trusts qualify for the § 541(c)(2) exclusion.
11 U.S.C.A. § 541(c)(2) (referring to "[a] restriction on the transfer of a beneficial
interest of the debtor in a trust"). No argument is made that Meehan's IRA is not
a trust. Moreover, by definition, an IRA is a trust. 26 U.S.C.A. § 498(a) ('[T~he
term 'individual retirement account' means trust .... ).
Meehan, 102 F.3d at 1212 n.4. See also Lowenschuss v. Selnick, 171 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 1999) (disagreeing
with Meehan to the extent that Meehan had not required the anti-alienation provision to be in the
instrument creating the IRA) and In re Zott, 225 B.R. 160, 163 n.3 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1998).
89 These requirements [of exclusion under Bankruptcy Code § 541(c)(2)] are the fol-
lowing: (1) the IRA must constitute a "trust" within the meaning of 11 U.S.C.
§ 541(c)(2); (2) the funds in the IRA must represent the debtor's "beneficial inter-
est" in that trust; (3) the IRA must be qualified under Section 408 of the Internal
Revenue Code; (4) the provision of NJ.SA. § 25:2-1 stating that property held in a
qualifying IRA is "exempt from all claims of creditors" must be a "restriction on the
transfer" of the IRA funds; and (5) this restriction must be "enforceable under
nonbankruptcy law." In this appeal, the trustee's arguments do not focus on any of
the first three requirements, and thus we assume for present purposes that they are
satisfied.
Orr v. Yuhas (In re Yuhas), 104 F.3d 612, 614 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. den. 521 U.S. 1105 (1997). The
Bankruptcy Court decision explains why no analysis of IRC § 408(a) was necessary: "Under NJ.S.A. 25:2-
1(b) a qualifying trust is defined as a trust created or qualified and maintained pursuant to federal law,
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Courts that have squarely confronted the issue of whether IRC § 408(a)
turns all IRAs into trusts for bankruptcy exclusion purposes have declined to
arrive at this conclusion.9° The well-reasoned opinion in Pineo v. Fulton (In
re Fulton)91 is a leading example. The opinion begins by noting that "trust" is
not defined in the Bankruptcy Code and its meaning would therefore nor-
mally be a question of state law.92 Looking to Pennsylvania law, the court
noted that a trust does not exist unless there is a trustee, trust property, a
beneficiary, separation of legal title and beneficial interest, and manifestation
of intent by the settlor to create a trust.93 The court rejected the argument
that IRC § 408(a) turned all IRAs into trusts because later in the same sec-
tion IRC § 408(h) provides that IRAs held in custodial accounts shall be
treated as trusts. 94 The court concluded that "if all custodial accounts actu-
ally constituted trusts under nontax law, then Congress in I.R.C. § 408(h) ...
would not have had any need ..." to deem custodial accounts as trusts. 95
including section 401, 403, 408, or 409 of the Internal Revenue Code. Since the IRA at issue was created
pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 408, it is a qualifying trust under the statute." Tuhas, 186 B.R. 381, 383 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 1995). New Jersey law expressly declared that IRAs were trusts, thus the efficacy of IRC § 408(a)
was not considered. See also Zott at 166.
9°In re Hipple, 225 BR. 808 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996) may represent an exception. Hipple dealt with a
SEP-IRA that the court analyzed closely. While the court concluded the SEP/IRA was a trust, it held
that there was no applicable nonbankruptcy law restricting transfer:
The federal law applicable to SEP/IRA's is 26 U.S.C. § 408 et seq. Thus, it is a
trust created by statute .... Since § 408 prohibits restriction of the beneficiary's
right of withdrawal and permits the beneficiary to retain the right to direct invest-
ments, the beneficiary retains dominion and control under federal law. Therefore,
the court concludes that Debtor's SEP/IRA is not excluded from property of
Debtor's estate under applicable nonbankruptcy federal law.
Id. at 814.
9i 2 4 0 B.R. 854 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1999). See also Hermes v. Ribitwer (In re Hermes), 239 B.R. 491
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999).
92Fultori, 240 BR. 854. Accord, In re Hanes, 162 BR. 733, 741 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1994) ('To determine
whether these plans are trusts, we look to state law.").
9 3Fulton, 240 B.R. at 863.
94 (h) Custodial accounts. For purposes of this section, a custodial account shall be
treated as a trust if the assets of such account are held by a bank (as defined in
subsection (n)) or another person who demonstrates, to the satisfaction of the Sec-
retary, that the manner in which he will administer the account will be consistent
with the requirements of this section, and if the custodial account would, except for
the fact that it is not a trust, constitute an individual retirement account described
in subsection (a). For purposes of this title, in the case of a custodial account treated
as a trust by reason of the preceding sentence, the custodian of such account shall
be treated as the trustee thereof.
26 U.S.C. § 408(h).
95Fulton, 240 B.R. at 865. The court went on to note that the retirement funds at issue were annui-
ties. Individual retirement annuities are not deemed as trusts in IRC § 408(b). Even though the court's
opinion with respect to individual retirement accounts may be dicta, the quality of its analysis has proved
persuasive.
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The Fulton opinion has proved persuasive to other courts96 and it seems
unlikely that IRC § 408(a) standing alone will provide even the first step
toward exclusion of IRAs from the bankruptcy estate as spendthrift trusts.
Tax qualification alone should not be sufficient to keep an asset out of the
bankruptcy estate.97 A first step toward exclusion of IRAs from the reach of
the trustee must be found, if at all, in state law.98
B. IRAs AND STATE TRUST LAW
Can IRAs be trusts under state law?99 There is no prohibition on divid-
ing the interests in an IRA between the legal and beneficial. Individual re-
tirement accounts may be established under a trust agreement. 100 Yet most
IRAs are held in the form of custodial accounts. 10 Custodial accounts exist
by virtue of a statute 0 2 and either explicitly state or are interpreted to mean
that the beneficiary has full title of the custodial assets. 0 3 Custodial ac-
96 See, e.g., In re Barnes, 264 BR. 415 (E.D. Mich. 2001); In re Hong, No. 01-JAB35072, 2002 WL
1465737, at *2 (Bankr. D. Utah June 4, 2002).
97 It is the qualified plan's combination of override of constructive receipt with the
imposition of anti-alienation restrictions that may adequately support putting the
pension trust in the category of trusts to be excluded from the bankruptcy estate -
the override of constructive receipt alone does not provide a principled basis for
exclusion of qualified plans from the bankruptcy estate.
The Pension Shield, supra note 74 at 409.
9
sOf course, state law (like New Jersey) may deem all IRAs to be trusts, which may bring the matter
to a clear conclusion. See Tuhas, 104 F.3d 612, 614 (3d Cir. 1997). Such state legislation raises the
question of the extent to which a bankruptcy court should defer to a state's definition of -trust" when
interpreting Bankruptcy Code § 541(c)(2).
"For purposes of this section, general trust law will be analyzed in light of the Restatements (Second
and Third) of Trusts.
A trust, as the term is used in this Restatement ... is a fiduciary relationship with
respect to property, arising as a result of a manifestation of an intention to create
that relationship and subjecting the person who holds title to the property to duties
to deal with it for the benefit of charity or for one or more persons, at least one of
whom is not the sole trustee.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996).
i"°See, e.g., Walker v. Davis (In re Estate of Davis), 225 I11. App. 3d 998, 1006, 589 N.E.2d 154, 162
(1992) ("In contrast to the custodial account IRA in Philip, the IRA at bar was established as a trust
under a trust agreement.").
i"iSee also I.R.C. § 408(h) (treating IRAs held in custodial accounts as trusts for certain purposes).
iO'See, e.g., the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act § 9 (1983).
i03 This so-called "custodianship" is sometimes referred to in this Restatement [(Third)
of Trusts] as a "virtual trust" and is a relationship to which the rules of this Re-
statement apply .... For Restatement purposes, however, trust treatment for this
particular form of custodianship is appropriate because other elements of the trust
relationship are present. Furthermore, the language and substance of these statutes
are generally consistent with the custodian having title-based authority over the
property and with the beneficiary having all of the beneficial rights and interests.
Thus, although custodianships under the various versions of the Uniform Transfers
to Minors Act (and of the predecessor Uniform Gifts to Minors Act) technically
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counts differ from trusts in the degree of control the settlor retains over the
assets: 1a] 'custody' or 'custodial' account is a type of agency account in
which the custodian has the obligation to preserve and safekeep the property
entrusted to him for his principal."' 0 4 The lack of separation of legal and
beneficial interests in the IRA is inconsistent with a claim that the IRA is
itself a trust.105 Where an IRA is held by a trust, it is the ownership of the
IRA by the trustee that creates the trust, not the settlor's creation of the
IRA.'0 6 State courts have rejected the argument that IRAs are trusts for
state law purposes based on IRC § 408(a). 10 7 It is thus unlikely that a state
court would conclude that IRAs as such are trusts.'08 If an IRA is not a
trust, then Bankruptcy Code § 541(c)(2) will not apply to exclude it from
the debtor's estate.10 9
Even if an IRA were deemed to be a trust under state law, very few
would qualify as a spendthrift trust. According to the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TRUSTS, a spendthrift trust is a trust "in which by the terms of the
are not trust entities, this Restatement treats these particular custodianships and
custodians respectively as trusts and trustees .... Accordingly, these relationships
are subject to the rules of trust law stated in this Restatement, except as the provi-
sions of the applicable statute expressly or by necessary implication require
otherwise.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 5 Ill. 1 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996).
10 4Estate of Davis, 225 I1. App. 3d at 1006, 589 N.E.2d at 162. See also In re CRS Steam, Inc., 217
BR. 365, 370 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998) ("An instrument which requires a party holding funds of another to
do nothing with the funds without directions from the owner creates the relationship of principal and
agent rather than beneficiary and trustee."); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TRUSTS § 8 (1959) ("An agency
is not a trust.").
105 In order to create what we shall term, for purposes of the analysis of the
§ 541(c)(2) exclusion in this opinion, a 'true" trust, there must be a designated
beneficiary, a trustee, a fund sufficiently identified to enable title to pass to the
trustee, and actual delivery to the trustee with the intent of passing title. IRAs
lack a trustee and delivery of title to the trustee .... There is no trustee and there is
no separation of title and beneficial interest: the depositor holds title to and is the
beneficiary of the account.
Eisenberg v. Houck (In re Houck), 181 BR. 187, 191 n.9 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) (citations omitted).
106Estate of Davis, 225 11. App. 3d at 1007, 589 N.E.2d at 162 ('A custodial account IRA is not an
express trust because there is no intent to establish a trust.").
i° 7See, e.g., Estate of Davis, 171 Cal. App. 3d 854, 857, 217 Cal. Rptr. 734, 736 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)
("The court's finding that the IRAs be treated as trusts is limited to Internal Revenue Code section 408's
purpose of tax deferment.").
1°SSee, e.g., In re Hanes, 162 BR. 733, 741 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1994) ("The elements for establishing a
valid trust in Virginia include 'a competent settlor and trustee, an ascertainable res, and certain
beneficiaries.'").
i°-Without the requisite elements and intent, the Olin and Squibb plans are not trusts. Thus, they
cannot come within the exclusion of § 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. Rather, these plans are bare
contractual obligations, which courts have found, in similar situations, to be part of the bankruptcy estate."
Id. at 742. See also In re Riley, 91 B.R. 389, 390 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988) (holding that an annuity could not
be a trust because "at a minimum, the intention to create a trust with the applicable spendthrift provisions
must be manifest").
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trust or by statute a valid restraint on the voluntary and involuntary transfer
of the interest of the beneficiary is imposed .... "110 Notwithstanding the
presence of an anti-alienation provision in an IRA, its creator can close the
account and demand that the custodian return the funds.1 The anti-aliena-
tion clause is ineffective to turn the IRA into a spendthrift trust because it
cannot prevent the voluntary alienation of assets held in the account." 2
The common law of trusts renders Bankruptcy Code § 541(c)(2) inappli-
cable to IRAs. Individual retirement accounts will not qualify as trusts
under state common law.113 At their most protective, IRAs represent a cus-
todial account that fails as a trust because the custodian serves merely as an
agent for the principal. At their weakest, the IRA relationship is one of
creditor and debtor, which certainly fails as a trust. Nor are IRAs capable of
being protected against alienation by their creators. Anti-alienation provi-
sions enforceable against only creditors of the beneficiary and not against the
beneficiary's own actions fail as a spendthrift trust. Finally, IRAs are self-
settled. No state permits a person to place the legal interest in assets beyond
the reach of his creditors while continuing to enjoy the benefit of the same
assets. If IRAs are to be protected from the claims of the trustee in bank-
ruptcy in the thirty-four states that have exercised their power under Bank-
ruptcy Code § 522(b)(1), the shield can come only from a state's exemption
laws.
2. In the absence of a state statute Only pursuant to
exempting IRAs, is there any means by which Bankruptcy Code
an IRA can be preserved for the debtor in § 522(d)(10)(E)in the
bankruptcy? few non-opt-out
states.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT AND ERISA PREEMPTION
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution" 4 mandates the conclusion
"'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 152(2) (1959).
"'See Eisenberg v. Houck (In re Houck), 181 BR. 187, 192 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) ('Federal law does
not prevent Debtor from closing out the account - it merely imposes a penalty for early withdrawal.").
"
2 Id. (-Debtor's ability to withdraw the funds in his IRA is not restricted as it would be if the funds
were held in a spendthrift trust or an ERISA qualified plan.").
.
3A state's statutory law may change this result. See supra notes 88 and 97.
114 This constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under Authority of the
United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every state
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
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that any state law inconsistent with a federal statute must be preempted.
The nature of the inconsistency occasioning preemption comes in two forms:
conflict preemption and field preemption. Conflict preemption is straightfor-
ward: when a federal statute says "do X" and a state law says "do not do X,"
the state law is preempted. Field preemption occurs when a state law "in-
trudes" into a "field" of legislative activity "occupied" by the federal statute.
The state law is preempted even though it does not conflict with any partic-
ular provision of the federal statute because the "' federal interest' in the field
that a federal statute addresses [is] . . . 'so dominant' that federal law 'will be
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.'"115
Federal statutes do not need an express preemption clause to trump state
law. 1 16 Yet the Supreme Court's articulation of field preemption over the
years has been ad hoc.117 Congress has responded occasionally by expressly
providing for preemption. If Congress expressly legislates preemption then
its preemption provision should be construed like any other statute: "lij]udges
confronted with such a clause face a two-fold task: They must decide what
the clause means, and they must decide whether the Constitution permits
Congress to bar the states from exercising the powers in question."118 Yet
this straightforward approach is not the current approach employed by the
Supreme Court. When Congress acts to preempt state law in areas such as
the general health, safety, and welfare, the Court has held that express pre-
emption clauses should be given a "narrow reading."119 In other words, the
Court asserts that a "presumption against preemption" should be applied
when Congress legislates in the areas of traditional state powers. 120
Shortly before ERISA's enactment the Supreme Court's preemption anal-
ysis had shifted in favor of increased federalism, thus preserving more and
more concurrent state regulation of areas in a field of apparent federal regula-
15 Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 227 (2000) [hereinafter Preemption].
"
6There is a simple reason for the rarity of express preemption clauses; the Constitution expressly
provides that the laws of the United States effectively repeal any state law to the contrary. U.S. CONST.
art. VI, cl. 2. In fact, Congress commonly includes a 'savings clause" by which it expressly permits simul-
taneous state regulation of the same subject matter. See generally 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E.
NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 12.1 (1992).
iiYPreemption, supra note 115 at 232 (-[M]odern preemption jurisprudence is a muddle.").
18Preemption, supra note 115 at 226-27.
ii9See, e.g., California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. 316, 330-
32 (1997); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504,
518, 523 (1992); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
"'For discussion of whether exemption laws fall within the rubric of 'health, safety and welfare," see
infra text accompanying notes 147-49 and 162. See also Chicago Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Il1. ex
rel. Drainage Comm'rs., 200 U.S. 561, 592 (1906) (The police power is that power of a state that 'em-
braces regulations designed to promote the public convenience or the general prosperity as well as those
designed to promote the public health, the public morals, or the public safety.").
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tion.12 1 Since ERISA's enactment the Supreme Court has considered its pre-
emptive effects many times. Most of these decisions involved the scope of
preemption in connection with welfare benefit plans, particularly with regard
to claims arising out of plans that provide for health care. 122 For the pur-
poses of this article, however, the decisions finding preemption in cases of
pension plans are more relevant. It is pension plans that are excluded from a
debtor's bankruptcy estate and it is IRAs that were given tax advantages in
the Internal Revenue Code for which states are providing exemptions.
While the Supreme Court has subtly changed its preemption analysis for
welfare benefit plans in recent years, it has not clearly stated whether this
adjustment carries over to scrutiny for pension plan preemption. This article
will thus consider welfare plan preemption cases to see if the trajectory of the
revised paradigm of the Court's preemption analysis will extend to exemp-
tions of IRAs integrated with pension plans.
A. PRE-Travelers Pension Plan Preemption Analysis
It might seem that there is no basis on which to distinguish between the
Court's analysis of welfare and pension plan preemption. After all, the only
express preemption provision is ERISA § 514(a), and it makes no distinction
between the nature of the plan to which it applies. Yet the unstable catego-
ries of field and conflict preemption come into play even in this example of
express preemption. Recall that ERISA § 514(a) states that ERISA super-
sedes state laws if they "relate to" a nonexempt employee benefit plan. Diffi-
culty with applying the express language of this statute becomes apparent
when we realize that the phrase "relate to" describes no more than a logical
relationship; it does not specify the applicable degree of the relationship. 123
Notwithstanding the ambiguity of ERISA's preemption clause, during the
first twenty years of ERISA's existence the Court has persisted in trying to
determine Congress's intent in framing § 514(a) by looking solely to its
words in isolation from any larger context.124
In the first preemption case to reach the Court's docket, Alessi v. Raybes-
"'iThe stage on which Congress expressed its intent to preempt in ERISA had shifted significantly in
the year preceding its enactment in the summer of 1974. See generally David E. Engdahl, Preemptive Capa-
bility of Federal Power, 45 U. CoLo. L. REv. 51 (1973); William W. Bratton, Jr., Note, The Preemption
Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623, 634 (1975);
and John Timothy McCauley, AFDC Eligibility Conditions Unrelated to Need: The Impact of Dublino, 49
IND. L.J. 334 (1973-1974).
i"'See, e.g., Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 123 S. Ct. 1471 (2003).
"'"'[R]elates to' is a term that requires a modifier in order to have a concrete meaning, and the wide
spectrum of possible modifiers - directly, slightly, remotely - suggests a wide spectrum of possible mean-
ings." Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article About ERISA Preemption? A Case Study of the Failure of
Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 35, 47 (1996) [hereinafter, The Last Article].
i"4See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
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tos-Manhattan, Inc.,125 New Jersey had acted to prohibit employer-sponsored
pension plans from offsetting a disabled retiree's pension benefits by the
amount of any workers' compensation award he may have received. 126 The
state statute was designed to prevent reduction of pension benefits by inte-
gration with workers' compensation. Two groups of retirees challenged their
employers' plans that provided for integration and prevailed before the Dis-
trict Court. The Third Circuit reversed on several grounds, including that
ERISA § 514(a) preempted New Jersey's prohibition of integration. The Su-
preme Court began its analysis by noting its bias against federal preemption
of state laws: "[o]ur analysis of this problem must be guided by respect for
the separate spheres of governmental authority preserved in our federalist
system." 127 Yet in the case of pension plans Congress had acted to reverse
this presumption with ERISA § 514(a).128 In view of this Congressional ac-
tion, the Court concluded that New Jersey's prohibition of integration re-
lated to pension plans "because it eliminates one method for calculating
pension benefits - integration - that is permitted by federal law."' 29
Alessi presented an easy case.130 The Court did not need to analyze the
degree of relationship necessary to cause preemption. The New Jersey statute
both specifically referred to retirement pension benefits and limited the free-
dom of plan administrators to structure pension benefits in a way that ER-
ISA specifically authorized.' 3 ' Even without ERISA § 514(a), it seems likely
that the New Jersey statute would have run afoul of traditional conflict pre-
emption doctrine. If Congress "contemplated and approved the kind of pen-
sion provisions challenged here,"' 32 then a state law prohibiting integration
should have fallen even if the Court had employed a presumption against
preemption. State exemption laws, however, place no limitation on the abil-
ity of plan administrators to structure pension benefits. Nor is there a body
of pre-ERISA practice or legislative history from which an inference of con-
125451 U.S. 504 (1981).
"'Id. at 507-08.
1271d. at 522.
2 This provision [ERISA § 514(a)] demonstrates that Congress ... meant to establish pension plan
regulation as exclusively a federal concern." Id. at 523.
129M. at 524.
3
'Although the Court admitted that the phrase "relates to" 'gives rise to some confusion where, as
here, it is asserted to apply to a state law ostensibly regulating ... the State's workers' compensation
awards, which obviously are subject to the State's police power." Id. at 524.
"'The Court concluded from the legislative history that Congress expressly intended to permit inte-
gration of pension benefits with social security and railroad retirement benefits. Id. at 515 (quoting H.R.
Rep. No. 93-807 at 69 (1974)). The Court expanded the range of authorized integration to include work-
ers' compensation because it was allowed by pre-ERISA Revenue Rulings that Congress approved. Id. at
521.
M Id. at 526.
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gressional intent to prohibit can be drawn. Of course, Alessi was not the last
word on preemption.
A pair of New York laws that affected employee welfare plans reached
the Court two years later in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.13 3 Both of these
statutes mandated specific benefits. New York's Human Rights Law prohib-
ited employment discrimination on the basis of sex. The New York state
courts had determined that an employer who excluded pregnancy from cov-
ered health insurance benefits discriminated within the meaning of the stat-
ute. New York's Disability Benefits Law required employers to pay limited
benefits to employees disabled even by nonoccupational illnesses or injuries.
The mandated benefits included pregnancy-related disabilities.
Several employers sought injunctive relief from the application of both
New York statutes on the ground the New York laws were preempted by
ERISA. Similar to the situation in Alessi, the New York laws affected the
administration of employee benefit plans. Unlike Alessi, there was little in
legislative history or pre-ERISA practice by which the Court could make
concrete the meaning of the abstract "relate to" of ERISA § 514(a). 134 None-
theless, the Court labored to determine the appropriate reach of the preemp-
tion provision by determining Congress's intent.135 Without any specific
legislative history the Court turned to the dictionary, holding that "[a] law
,relates to' an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the word, if it has
a connection with or reference to such a plan." 136 Given this expansive (but
equally ambiguous) reformulation of "relates to," the Court proceeded to hold
that ERISA § 514(a) preempted the New York Human Rights Law because
it required plan administrators to provide benefits that are not required by
ERISA or other federal law. 137 The Court concluded that the Disability Ben-
efits Law was not preempted but not because it fell outside the expansive
range of "connection with or refer to." Rather, this state law was saved by
113463 U.S. 85 (1983).
134 The Court recently considered § 514(a) in Alessi, supra .... The Court relied ...
on the state law's frustration of congressional intent. That kind of tension is not
present in these cases; while federal law did not prohibit pregnancy discrimination
during the relevant period, Congress, in enacting ERISA, demonstrated no desire to
permit it. Alessi's recognition of the exclusive federal role in regulating benefit
plans, therefore, is instructive but not dispositive.
Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96 n.15. The Court thus converted not simply congressional silence but perceived
congressional inattention into intent to prohibit.
135-In deciding whether a federal law preempts a state statute, our task is to ascertain Congress' intent
in enacting the federal statute at issue." Id. at 95.
1361d. at 96-97 (citing Black's Law Dictionary).
13"We hold that New York's Human Rights Law is pre-empted with respect to ERISA benefit plans
only insofar as it prohibits practices [i.e., discrimination on the basis of pregnancy] that are lawful under
federal law." Id. at 108.
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ERISA § 514(d) - the preemption savings clause. 138
The Supreme Court's turn of phrase "connection with or reference to"
quickly became a two-pronged rubric as lower courts applied it mechanically
in preemption cases thereafter. 39 Unfortunately, the "connection with" half
of the test falls victim to the same ambiguity as "relates to." Just as the term
"relates to" requires a modifier in order to have any concrete meaning, so too
does the phrase "connection with."140 But it is the unambiguous "reference
to" half of the mantra that exposes state exemption laws to the risk of pre-
emption. Would a mere reference to ERISA in a state's exemption law, with-
out more, trigger preemption? The Supreme Court itself expressed some
concern that its reformulation of the statutory "relates to" test of preemption
might sweep too broadly but failed to supply any limits in Shaw.141
ERISA's distinction between welfare benefit plans and pension plans
came to a head in 1988 in Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service,
Inc.142 A collection agency filed actions against a welfare benefit plan existing
under ERISA seeking to garnish the accrued but unpaid vacation and holiday
benefits of twenty-three longshoremen.4 3 The State of Georgia, however,
had acted to exempt welfare plan benefits because ERISA's anti-alienation
clause protected only pension benefits.144 On appeal, the Georgia Supreme
Court held that ERISA preempted the exemption statute and permitted the
garnishment to proceed.145 The plan trustees sought and the Supreme Court
issued a writ of certiorari. Initially relying on the "reference to" half of the
Shaw gloss on ERISA's anti-alienation provision, the Supreme Court unani-
138 [W]hile the Disability Benefits Law plainly is a state law relating to employee
benefit plans, it is not pre-empted if the plans to which it relates are exempt from
ERISA under § 4(b). Section 4(b)(3) exempts "any employee benefit plan... main-
tained solely for the purpose of complying with applicable ... disability insurance
laws." The Disability Benefits Law is a "disability insurance law," of course.
Id. at 106.
i39Abraham v. Norcal Waste Sys., 265 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2001) ("State law 'relates to' an ERISA
benefit plan if there is a 'connection with' or 'reference to' such a plan."); Carpenters Local Union No. 26 v.
United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 215 F.3d 136, 140 (1st Cir. 2000) ("The Court has devised a disjunctive
test: A law relates to a covered employee benefit plan for purposes of § 514(a) if it [1] has a connection
with or [2] a reference to such a plan."); McMahon v. Digital Equip. Corp., 162 F.3d 28, 38 (1st Cir.
1998) ("Ingersoll-Rand identified two tests for determining whether a state cause of action 'relates to' an
ERISA plan."); Ferrer v. Banco Cent. Hispano-Puerto Rico, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 190, 194 (D.P.R. 2001)
(Supreme Court "identifies two tests.").
'The Last Article, supra note 123, at 64.
i4i"Some state actions may affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a man-
ner to warrant a finding that the law 'relates to' the plan." Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n.21.
142486 U.S. 825 (1988).
143Id at 827.
144Id. at 828.
"'"Since [Ga.Code Ann.] § 18-4-22.1 'prohibits that which the federal statute permits,' the Georgia
Supreme Court held, the state law was 'in conflict with' the federal scheme, and therefore pre-empted by
it." Id. at 828.
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mously' 4 6 held that a statute "which singles out ERISA employee welfare
benefit plans for different treatment under state garnishment procedure, is
pre-empted under [ERISA] § 514(a) . .. [because] [t]he state statute's ex-
press reference to ERISA plans suffices to bring it within the federal law's
pre-emptive reach. " '47
The Court then went on to consider a second question: whether Geor-
gia's entire statutory garnishment system was preempted by ERISA when
the garnishee defendant was an employee welfare benefit plan. The trustees
argued that garnishment of a plan obviously "relates to" the plan and is there-
fore preempted. 148 A divided Court concluded that ERISA did not preempt
garnishment of a plan. The Court in part relied upon ERISA § 206(d)(1)
that bars alienation only of pension plan benefits. According to the majority,
the statute's protection of benefits and not plans meant that actions against
plans that did not affect pension benefits were not barred. 149 In addition, the
majority noted that Congress acted to prohibit alienation of pension benefits
from which it inferred that "Congress did not intend to preclude state-law
attachment of ERISA welfare plan benefits."15°
Unlike the New York statutes at issue in Shaw, the Georgia exemption
law would not have forced the plan to provide certain benefits in some states
and not in others. It would not have limited the design of plans by prohibit-
ing payment formulas that federal law allowed like the New Jersey legislature
had attempted in Alessi. Yet the Court held that ERISA § 514(a) preempted
the state exemption statute merely because it referred to pension plans even
though Georgia's protection extended only to employee welfare benefits.151
146See The Last Article supra note 123; see generally John H. Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks
Trusts, 1990 SuP. CT. REV. 207.
147Mackey, 486 U.S. at 830 (footnote omitted).
14s [P]etitioners assert that when an employee welfare benefit plan is garnished under
Georgia law by a creditor of a participant, plan trustees are served with a garnish-
ment summons, become parties to a suit, and must respond and deposit the de-
manded funds due the beneficiary-debtor .... Because garnishment will involve and
affect the plan and its trustees in these ways, petitioners submit the Georgia gar-
nishment law necessarily 'relates to" such ERISA welfare benefit plans and is
therefore pre-empted by § 514(a).
Id. at 831.
149 Section 206(d)(1) bars the assignment or alienation of pension plan benefits, and
thus prohibits the use of state enforcement mechanisms only insofar as they prevent
those benefits from being paid to plan participants. As discussed above, § 514(a),
by contrast, deals with state laws as they relate to plans . . . . [B]y adopting
§ 206(d)(1), Congress demonstrated that it could, where it wished to, stay the
operation of state law as it affects only benefits and not plans.
Id. at 836.
iSld, at 838.
is"[W]e hold that Ga. Code Ann. § 18-4-22.1, which singles out ERISA employee welfare benefit
plans for different treatment under state garnishment procedures, is pre-empted under § 514(a). The state
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What had been an unnecessary gloss on a decision that could have been justi-
fied as simple conflict preemption had assumed a life of its own when it was
extended beyond the facts of Shaw. On the other hand, a majority held that
ERISA did not preempt garnishment of welfare benefits even though its deci-
sion allowed the imposition of at least some administrative costs on the plan
by requiring the trustees to respond to the garnishment action. The five
justices who reached this decision carefully noted the congressional vacuum
with respect to alienation of welfare benefits and concluded that silence
meant permission: welfare plan benefits could be garnished.
The Supreme Court went on to decide several more ERISA preemption
cases before it realized that its earlier efforts to apply the "relates to" test in
the abstract had been misguided. Three of those cases deserve limited treat-
ment. The first was a simple product of ERISA § 206(d)(1). In Guidry v.
Sheet Metal Workers National Pension Fund52 the Court reversed a Tenth
Circuit decision permitting the imposition of a constructive trust on a defal-
cating union official's pension benefits. This case represented a straightfor-
ward application of ERISA's anti-alienation provision to an equitable remedy
with the same effect as garnishment. 53
The second case represented an extension of the "refer to" half of the
Shaw reformulation of the preemption standard of ERISA § 514(a). The Su-
preme Court in Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendonls confronted a case where
an employee's pension benefits were only indirectly at issue. Ingersoll-Rand
fired Perry McClendon when he believed he had only four months to work
before his pension benefits would be fully vested. McClendon sued in the
Texas state courts for wrongful termination, alleging that he was terminated
because his employer wished to avoid making contributions to his pension.
The Texas Supreme Court held that public policy limited the employment-
at-will doctrine in such cases.'"5 The Supreme Court held that ERISA
§ 514(a) preempted Texas's exception to at-will employment doctrine by
holding that "refer to" reached claims that did not have an impact on the
statute's express reference to ERISA plans suffices to bring it within the federal law's preemptive reach."
Id. at 830.
152493 U.S. 365 (1990).
15
'-We see no meaningful distinction between a writ of garnishment and the constructive trust rem-
edy imposed in this case." Id. at 372.
114498 U.S. 133 (1990).
155 The majority [of the Texas Supreme Court] reasoned that notwithstanding the
traditional employment-at-will doctrine, public policy imposes certain limitations
upon an employer's power to discharge at-will employees .... [T]he court held that
under Texas law a plaintiff could recover in a wrongful discharge action if he estab-
lished that "the principal reason for his termination was the employer's desire to
avoid contributing to or paying benefits under the employee's pension fund."
Id. at 136 (emphasis added).
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pension plan, the benefits payable by the plan or even the beneficiary of the
plan. All that was necessary for preemption was that the "existence of a
pension plan [which] is a critical factor in establishing liability under the
State's wrongful discharge law."15 6
In addition to applying the "relate to" gloss for express preemption, the
Court held in the alternative that Texas's restriction on at-will employment
was unenforceable because it conflicted with ERISA's exclusive civil enforce-
ment scheme. Citing its earlier decision in Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,157
the Court found that the Texas common law engendered a case of conflict
preemption. The Court reached this conclusion because on the one hand
ERISA § 510 provided a remedy for the wrong McClendon complained of
while on the other hand ERISA § 502 made that remedy exclusive. The
Court also maintained that permitting McClendon to proceed with his ac-
tion against Ingersoll-Rand would expose employers and plan sponsors to the
sorts of varying state rules that the sponsors of ERISA expressly sought to
avoid.1l 8 Thus Ingersoll-Rand again demonstrated that the Court's reliance
on the ambiguous "relates to" preemption provision was unnecessary to reach
the correct result. Ordinary preemption doctrine would have done the
job.159
The third case both applied the "refer to" half of the Shaw interpretation
of the relates to standard of ERISA preemption and foreshadowed changes to
come. The District of Columbia had passed legislation requiring employers
who provided health insurance for their active employees to supply it for
injured employees while they were receiving workers' compensation benefits.
The Court made short shrift of the District's act in District of Columbia v.
Greater Washington Bd. of Trade.160 In a brief opinion eight members of the
Court agreed that the act's reference to an ERISA benefit such as health
insurance in the workers' compensation law mandated preemption, citing the
series of "connection with or refer to" cases including Shaw, Ingersoll-Rand,
and Mackey: "[s]ection 2(c)(2) of the District's Equity Amendment Act spe-
cifically refers to welfare benefit plans regulated by ERISA and on that basis
alone is preempted."161 The majority did not assert that the requirement
imposed in Board of Trade could expose employers to inconsistent employee
benefit standards from state to state. The Court could have made this argu-
1561d. at 139-40.
157 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
5
'Allowing state based actions like the one at issue here would subject plans and plan sponsors to
burdens not unlike those that Congress sought to foreclose through § 514(a)." Id. at 142.
159Subsequent to the Supreme Court's 1995 decision in Travelers (see infra note 169), the Fourth
Circuit has limited the effect of the holding in Ingersoll-Rand to conflict preemption. See Darcangelo v.
Verizon Communications, Inc., 292 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 2002).
'60506 U.S. 125 (1992).
16lId. at 130.
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ment but seemed to deliberately narrow its holding to one of simple statutory
construction. 162 Perhaps there was a hope that a bright line test would stem
the tide of ERISA preemption litigation.
Justice Stevens dissented from the decision in Board of Trade. Although
he did not explicitly discuss the inherent ambiguity of "relates to," Justice
Stevens asserted that until Board of Trade every case that had employed the
'connection with or refer to" gloss could have been decided on ordinary pre-
emption grounds.163 Justice Stevens suggested that the Court employ some-
thing akin to simple conflict preemption164 and stop "mechanically repeating
earlier dictionary definitions of the word 'relate' as its only guide to decision
in an important and difficult area of statutory construction . "65 The
Court would answer his challenge three years later.
B. THE Travelers "Revolution"
The roots of what would later be the Court's retreat from a purely tex-
tual analysis of ERISA § 514(a) can be found in John Hancock Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank.166 Although Harris Trust dealt with
the ERISA savings clause for state regulation of insurance, six justices sig-
iS2 By refusing to look through its reformulation of ERISA § 514(a)'s 'relates to" standard of preemp-
tion to examine the congressional purpose for preemption, the Court was forced to misconstrue its analysis
in Shaw. Justice Thomas asserted that only the New York Human Rights law was preempted by ERISA.
Id. at 132 ("[O]nly the Human Rights Law ... fell within the pre-emption provision."). The Disability
Benefits Law, he claimed, "did not relate to a welfare plan subject to ERISA regulation." Id. at 133. This
is disingenuous. As Justice Thomas admitted earlier in the same paragraph, the Shaw Court concluded
that "both New York laws at issue there related to 'employee benefit plan[s]' in general," id. at 132, but
the Shaw opinion had nonetheless exempted the Disability Benefits Law from preemption under the sav-
ings provision of ERISA § 514(d). While it is indeed true that the latter statute "did not relate to a
welfare plan subject to ERISA regulation," the reason it was not subject to ERISA regulation was not
because it did not "relate to" a plan but because Congress had exempted certain laws from preemption
regardless of their relationship to ERISA. The Shaw Court held that a state could force an employer to
disaggregate employee welfare benefits and maintain a separately administered workers' compensation pro-
gram, a program which would be subject to state regulation: "[a] State may require an employer to main-
tain a disability plan complying with state law as a separate administrative unit. Such a plan would be
exempt under § 4(b)(3)." Shaw, 463 U.S. at 108. Acknowledging the complexity of the Shaw analysis,
however, would have undercut the Court's eagerness reduce to bare bones ERISA preemption analysis.
163 It is true, as the Court points out, that in Shaw ... we stated that a law "related
to" an employee benefit plan, "in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connec-
tion with or reference to such a plan." It is also true that we have repeatedly
quoted that language in later opinions .... It nevertheless is equally true that until
today that broad reading of the phrase has not been necessary to support any of this
Court's actual holdings.
Board of Trade, 506 U.S. at 134-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
is4-State laws that directly regulate ERISA plans, or that make it necessary for plan administrators to
operate such plans differently, 'relate to' such plans in the sense intended by Congress." Id. at 137 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
i5Id. at 138 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1665 1 0 U.S. 86 (1993).
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naled what was to come when they joined Justice Ginsburg's opinion that
concluded that "we discern no solid basis for believing that Congress, when it
designed ERISA, intended fundamentally to alter traditional preemption
analysis."167 Instead of asking if a state law had "a connection with or refer-
ence to" ERISA, the Court held that preemption would occur only when
state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress."168 Even the three dissenters, including Justice
Thomas who had emphasized a purely textual approach in Board of Trade,
did not express any disagreement with this aspect of the majority's opinion.
The substance of the dispute in Harris Trust, however, concerned state regu-
lation of insurance, an area specifically saved for the states by ERISA and
further reserved for state regulation by the long-standing federal McCarran-
Ferguson Act. The question remained open whether the Court's turn to
traditional preemption analysis would extend to ERISA § 514(a) standing
alone.
The Supreme Court's decision in New York State Conf. of Blue Cross &
Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co. 169 has generated an avalanche of legal
commentary. 70 New York had enacted a complex reimbursement system for
hospital services that had the effect of reimbursing insurers and health care
providers - including employee welfare plans - at different rates depending
on the degree of compliance by the providers with state-authorized goals.171
Several commercial insurance companies sought to enjoin enforcement of the
New York law on the ground that it was preempted by ERISA § 514(a)
because it had a "connection with" employee benefit plans. The District
Court' 72 and Second Circuit173 agreed with the insurers who obtained sum-
mary judgment.174 The Supreme Court unanimously reversed. The Court
admitted that increasing medical procedure surcharges or decreasing medical
1671d. at 99.
161ld. (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984)).
169514 U.S. 645 (1995).
'
7 See, e.g., Karen A. Jordan, Travelers Insurance: New Support for the Argument to Restrain ERISA
Pre.emption, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 255 (1996); Rebecca S. Fellman-Caldwell, New York State Conference of
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.: The Supreme Court Clarifies ERISA Preemp-
tion, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 1309 (1996); James Saya, Note, Removing A Roadblock to Reforming Health
Care: New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Company, 3
CONN. IN s. L.J. 127 (1996-97); David T. Shapiro, Note, The Remission of ERISA Preemption: An Exami-
nation of Blue Cross/Blue Shield v. Travelers Insurance Co., 28 CONN. L. REV. 917 (1996); Devon P.
Groves, ERISA Waivers and State Health Care Reform, 28 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 609 (1995).
i7'"A New York statute requires hospitals to collect surcharges from patients covered by a commercial
insurer but not from patients insured by a Blue Cross/Blue Shield plan, and it subjects certain health
maintenance organizations (HMO's) to surcharges that vary with the number of Medicaid recipients each
enrolls." Travelers, 514 U.S. at 649.
i7'Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 813 F. Supp. 996 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
i7VTravelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708 (2d Cir. 1993).
1741d. at 719 ("While the challenged statutes do not refer to ERISA plans, our examination of the
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procedure reimbursements, based on the operating policies of the patient's
insurer would "have an indirect economic effect on choices made by insurance
buyers including ERISA plans."175 It nonetheless held that the New York
law did not have the "requisite 'connection with' ERISA plans to trigger pre-
emption."1 76
Travelers is remarkable not so much for its holding (which, as the Court
pointed out, was consistent with the majority in Mackey177 ) as for its reason-
ing. The Court finally acknowledged that its efforts to define "relate to" had
been unavailing.178 The reason for its failure, the Court admitted, was that
the phrase "relate to" was not one of limitation; it is a restatement of an
abstract truism: that everything relates to everything else. 179 Moreover, the
Court concluded, if "relate to" were 'taken to extend to the furthest stretch
of its indeterminacy, then for all practical purposes pre-emption would never
run its course."' 80 But what of the Court's gloss on "relate to"? Is the phrase
.connection with or reference to" useful in specifying the nature of the rela-
tionship that warrants preemption? At least with respect to the "connection
with" half of the test the Court admitted that its efforts had been in vain:
"[fWor the same reasons that infinite relations cannot be the measure of pre-
emption, neither can infinite connections."' 8 ' Because the New York statute
at issue in Travelers did not refer to ERISA, the Court did not stop to con-
sider whether that half of its gloss was a workable tool by which to give
ERISA § 514(a) a concrete meaning. 8 2
surcharges indicates that they satisfy the less stringent 'connection with' standard embraced in Ingersoll-
Rand.") (citation omitted).
1STravelers, 514 U.S. at 659.
i7SId, at 662.
177 This conclusion is confirmed by our decision in Mackey .... We took no issue with
the argument of the Mackey plan's trustees that garnishment would impose admin-
istrative costs and burdens upon benefit plans..., but concluded from the text and
structure of ERISA's pre-emption and enforcement provisions that "Congress did
not intend to forbid the use of state-law mechanisms of executing judgments against
ERISA welfare benefit plans .... " If a law authorizing an indirect source of admin-
istrative cost in not pre-empted, it should follow that a law operating as an indirect
source of merely economic influence on administrative decisions, as here, should not
suffice to trigger pre-emption either.
Id. (citations omitted).
i1s7[W]e have to recognize that our prior attempt to construe the phrase 'relate to' does not give us
much help drawing the line here." Id. at 655. The Travelers decision is also noteworthy because it explic-
itly affirms what Justice Thomas had implicitly denied in Board of Trade: the Disability Benefits Law at
issue in Shaw did "relate to" ERISA. Id. at 657 ("[New York's] Disability Benefits Law, which require[d]
employers to pay employees specific benefits, clearly 'relate[d] to' benefit plans.").
i79-[R]eally, universally, relations stop nowhere." Id. at 655 (quoting H. James, Roderick Hudson xli
(New York ed., World's Classics 1980)).
1SOld.
iSild, at 656.
ss [T]he surcharge statutes cannot be said to make 'reference to' ERISA plans in any manner." Id.
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Without its long-standing tool for preemption, the Court asked whether
the New York statute would thwart the purposes of ERISA and recon-
structed its prior holdings in light of those purposes rather than relying on
the "unhelpful text" of ERISA § 514(a).18 3 It concluded that the New York
statute did not undermine ERISA's purposes and was in fact consistent with
other federal legislation enacted by the same Congress.184 The Court spent
the balance of its opinion analyzing whether the indirect economic impact of
the New York statute on ERISA plans was sufficient to justify preemption.
It also answered that question in the negative because "the indirect influence
of the surcharges [does not] preclude uniform administrative practice or the
provision of a uniform interstate benefit package." 185 By refraining preemp-
tion analysis in terms of the purpose of ERISA and economic impact of plan
administration, the Court seemed to open the door for state exemption of
employer-sponsored employee benefit plans together with IRAs. After all,
state exemption of a particular form of savings account neither undercuts
congressional goals nor imposes any burden on plan administrators. The
Court's reemphasis on the presumption against preemption when confronting
the states' exercise of historic police powers also augured well for the viabil-
ity of state exemption of IRAs even when intertwined with pension plans
subject to ERISA. 1s6 Yet the Court's failure to discuss the "refer to" half of
its earlier gloss meant that this issue remained open.
The Sixth Circuit had earlier suggested that the Court's application of the "refer to" test had never
operated independently of traditional preemption: "[w]hen the Court strikes down a statute that 'refers
to' ERISA or a covered plan, it does so not because of the reference per se; it does so because that reference
has a legal effect." Thiokol Corp. v. Roberts, 76 F.3d 751, 759 (6th Cir. 1996).
113After discussing Alessi, Ingersoll-Rand, Shaw, and legislative history, the Court concluded "[iun
each of these cases, ERISA pre-empted state laws that mandated employee benefit structures or their
administration. Elsewhere, we have held that state laws providing alternative enforcement mechanisms
also relate to ERISA plans, triggering pre-emption." Travelers, 514 U.S. at 658.
1S4Several months after passing ERISA, Congress passed the National Health Planning and Resources
Development Act of 1974 ("NHPRDA"), Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 (1974). NHPRDA author
ized the sort of surcharges imposed by the New York statute.
isTravelers, 514 U.S at 660.
186 [W]e ... have addressed claims of pre-emption with the starting presumption that
Congress does not intend to supplant state law. Indeed, in cases like this one,
where federal law is said to bar state action in fields of traditional state regulation,
we have worked on the "assumption that the historic police powers of the States
were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and mani-
fest purpose of Congress."
Id. at 654-55 (citations omitted). Writing shortly after the decision in Travelers, Professor Jordan devel-
oped four criteria for evaluating preemption in the new order of things: (1) articulating a tighter standard
for preemption where state law affects the benefit structure or administration of a plan, (2) increased
significance of evaluating the purpose and effect of the state law, (3) discounting indirect economic impact,
and (4) using standard implied preemption analysis. Karen A. Jordan, Travelers Insurance, supra note 170
at 286-92.
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C. POST- Travelers Continuing Confusion
The hope that Travelers signaled the first step in a new, clear direction for
ERISA preemption analysis remains unfulfilled. In the Court's next preemp-
tion case, California Div. of Labor Standards v. Dillingham Construction, 1 7
Justice Thomas resurrected the "connection with" half of the Shaw gloss,
albeit with the admission it could not be applied with "uncritical literal-
ism." s8 8 The Court's opinion in Dillingham also reaffirmed in passing the
"reference to" half of the test.18 9 Of particular interest in Dillingham was the
unlikely concurring opinion of Justices Scalia and Ginsburg who concluded
that the Court's continued "obeisance" to all its prior ERISA cases did more
harm than good. Instead of trying to elucidate the meaning of the abstract
"relates to," they recommended that the Court simply acknowledge what
they said it had been doing all along: "apply[ing] ordinary field pre-emption,
and, of course, ordinary conflict pre-emption."190
Later that term the Court decided Boggs v. Boggs.191 The Court's opinion
in Boggs has proved opaque.192 The Court in Boggs was confronted with a
confluence of Louisiana community property law, three ERISA plans, and
ERISA preemption. Although the majority opinion authored by Justice Ken-
nedy seems ultimately to be grounded on simple conflict preemption, 193 the
facts of the case and recondite nature of the Court's reasoning are instructive.
Isaac Boggs worked for BellSouth from 1949 until his retirement in 1985.194
For the first forty years of his employment Isaac was married to Dorothy
Boggs with whom he had three children. Shortly after Dorothy's death in
187519 U.S. 316 (1997).
""'Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 325. In fact, Justice Thomas's reference to the venerable "connection with"
half of the gloss might have been little more than window dressing. See, e.g., Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S.
141, 147 (2001) (applying "connection with" in terms of the objectives of ERISA and the nature of the
effect of state law on an ERISA plan).
isS9Under the latter inquiry, we have held pre-empted a law that impos[ed] requirements by reference
to [ERISA] covered programs; a law that specifically exempted ERISA plans from an otherwise generally
applicable garnishment provision; and a common-law cause of action premised on the existence of an ER-
ISA plan." Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 324 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
i9°Id. at 335 (Scalia and Ginsburg, concurring).
'9i520 U.S. 833 (1997).
i92Even an ERISA professional journal admitted that it was difficult to articulate the holding in Boggs.
See Boggs v. Boggs Holds That A Predeceasing Nonparticipant Spouse Has No Property Interest In An
ERISA Pension Plan, ERISA LITIG. REP., at 1, [hereinafter Boggs v. Boggs Holds], ("Our first objective is
to tell you what was held. This is a little harder than one might think."). Virtually the only sustained
analysis of Boggs is found in a student note. See Tony Vecino, Note, Boggs v. Boggs: State Community
Property and Succession Rights Wallow in ERISA's Mire, 28 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 571 (1998) [here-
inafter ERISA's Mire].
ig9"Conventional conflict pre-emption principles require pre-emption where compliance with both fed-
eral and state regulations is a physical impossibility, . . . or where state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Boggs, 520 U.S. at 844
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
1941d. at 836.
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1979, Isaac married Sandra Boggs to whom he remained married until his
death. Isaac and Sandra had no children. During the course of his employ-
ment by BellSouth Isaac participated in three retirement plans subject to
ERISA: a Savings Plan (that Isaac rolled over into an IRA at his retirement),
an employee stock ownership plan (holding stock in AT&T at Isaac's retire-
ment) and a defined benefit plan (composed of an annuity). 195
Dorothy's estate under Louisiana community property law included an
undivided one-half interest in all community assets (including Isaac's pension
benefits) at her death. 196 Dorothy's will bequeathed outright to Isaac one-
third of her interest in the community property. 97 The will provided that
the remaining two-thirds were to go to Isaac for life, 198 and to their children
upon his death.' 99 Upon his death, Isaac's will provided for a life estate in all
his property for his second wife Sandra, thus substantially delaying his chil-
dren's enjoyment of what they had expected to receive under their mother's
will.200
Isaac's children sought two forms of relief in Louisiana state court. They
asked for an accounting of the value of their father's life estate from which
they planned to calculate the portion of his retirement benefits traceable to
their mother's community interest.20' Once calculated, this amount would
represent the sum to which the children believed they were entitled at Isaac's
death. The children initially also sought a judgment from the state court
awarding them the relevant portions of all of Isaac's retirement benefits.202
Sandra responded with an action in federal court seeking a declaration that
ERISA preempted any application of Louisiana state law that would dimin-
ish her interest in Isaac's property.203 The District Court disagreed,204 as did
195 Upon retirement, Isaac received various benefits from his employer's retirement
plans. One was a lump-sum distribution from the Bell System Savings Plan . .. ,
which he rolled over into an Individual Retirement Account (IRA) .... He also
received 96 shares of AT&T stock from the Bell South Employee Stock Ownership
Plan (ESOP). In addition, Isaac enjoyed a monthly annuity payment during his
retirement of $1,777.67 from the Bell South Service Retirement Program.
Id.
196Id. at 837.
1971d. at 836.
'Technically, Dorothy bequeathed Isaac a -lifetime usufruct" in the residue of her estate; the court
treated Isaac's form of ownership as a life estate and so will this article. Id.
'99Id. at 837.20O0 d.
°2'ERISA's Mire, supra note 192, at 578-79 (relying on United States Supreme Court Official Tran-
script at 33-34, Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1774 (1997) (No. 96-79)).
20 2Boggs, 520 U.S. at 837. See also Boggs v. Boggs, 849 F. Supp. 462, 464 (E.D. La. 1994). For an
attempt to quantify that to which the children of Dorothy and Isaac were entitled under Louisiana law,
see Boggs v. Boggs Holds, supra note 192 at 6.
20 3Boggs v. Boggs, 849 F. Supp. 462, 464 (E.D. La. 1994).
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the majority of the Fifth Circuit panel that heard Sandra's appeal. 20 5 For
those courts, community property law did not sufficiently "relate to" ERISA
to justify preemption.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the conclusions of the lower courts.
The Court did not, however, reach the question of whether a community
property regime "related to" a pension plan of a married participant. Instead,
Justice Kennedy concluded that the children's claims conflicted with various
provisions of ERISA. The easiest case for the Court to dispose of was a claim
to a share of the Annuity remaining unpaid after Isaac's death. Any claim by
the heirs of the predeceasing legatee in the Annuity arising by virtue of the
legatee's community property interest potentially conflicted with ERISA's
requirement that every qualified joint and survivor annuity must pay not less
than 50% of the amount of an annuity to a surviving spouse, including a
second spouse such as Sandra.2°6 Even though Sandra would in fact have
received more than 50% of the Annuity after satisfaction of the children's
claims,20 7 the Court feared that to allow any reduction in the survivor's an-
nuity by a previous testamentary transfer could ultimately expose the subse-
quent surviving spouse to a greater than 50% reduction in his or her share of
an annuity. 208
More difficult were the cases presented by the children's claims to Isaac's
pension interests that he had received before his death. Isaac had received
some payments from the Annuity and all of the Savings Plan and AT&T
stock before his death. As the dissent noted, "[a]s far as ERISA is concerned,
204 Enforcement of Louisiana's community property law simply would not cause 'major damage' to any
'clear and substantial federal interest' served by ERISA." Id. at 465.
205 A state community property system that affects what a plan participant does with
his benefits after they are received does not impermissibly intrude on the mandates
ERISA imposes on plan administrators. The controversy in this case is between
successive spouses and their heirs. The focus of this case is not the relationship
between the administrator of this ERISA plan and its beneficiary. ERISA's preemp-
tive scope may be broad but it does not reach claims that do not involve the admin-
istration of plans, even though the plan may be a party to a suit or the claim relies
on the details of the plan .... This Court concludes that, under the facts of this
case, the Louisiana community property law is not sufficiently "related to" an em-
ployee benefit plan to necessitate ERISA preemption.
Boggs v. Boggs, 82 F.3d 90, 96 (5th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
216Boggs, 520 U.S. at 842 (citing ERISA § 205(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a)).
'07-In this case, Sandra's annuity would be reduced by approximately 20% ... " Id. at 844.2 0
'"There is no reason why testamentary transfers could not reduce a survivor's annuity by an even
greater [than twenty percent] amount." Id. The Court did not provide an example of how a predeceasing
nonparticipant spouse could ever have a greater than fifty percent interest in the surviving participant's
annuity. In any event, a reduction in Sandra's joint and survivor annuity by only twenty percent is
permissible. ERISA § 205(d)(1) requires only that the spouse of the participant receive "not less than 50
percent of ... the amount of the annuity which is payable during the joint lives of the participant and the
spouse." 29 U.S.C. § 1055(d)(1).
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Isaac could have used the [distributed] retirement benefits to pay for a vaca-
tion, to buy a house, or to bet at the races, or he could have given the money
to his children."20 9 So why then would any claim by the legatees of the prede-
ceasing spouse to community property that was no longer subject to ERISA
be preempted? The majority's answer was to look to the familiar anti-aliena-
tion provision of ERISA § 206(d)(1) as amended by the Retirement Equity
Act of 1984 (REAct)210 with its modification of § 206(d)(3). 211 First, the
Court held that a nonparticipant spouse's testamentary transfer of an interest
in retirement benefits acquired by virtue of community property amounts to
an "alienation." 21 2 This is the case even though such a "transfer" can have no
impact on the participant spouse. Second, according to Justice Kennedy,
Congress's express recognition of the community interest of a nonparticipant
spouse through the entry of a qualified domestic relations order ("QDRO")
entailed the exclusion of any other form of "alienation" by the nonparticipant
spouse such as Dorothy's attempted testamentary transfer.2' 3 If Dorothy's
testamentary transfer were void, it ultimately would not matter that her
children were seeking only an accounting. Even though Sandra might pay
any claim ultimately allowed from nonretirement assets, the claim was itself
preempted according to the Court.
The majority reached to find conflicts on which to base the holding of
preemption. The majority was willing to extend the mandatory minimum
payment of 50% of an undistributed retirement annuity to a surviving spouse
to prohibit even Dorothy's testamentary transfer of less than 50% of the
2 9Id. at 865 (5-4 decision) (Breyer, J., dissenting).2 iORetirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98,397, § 104, 98 Stat. 1426, 1433,36 (1984).
2 i.REAct greatly increased the interests of the nonemployee spouse in a participant's pension assets in
two respects. First, it provided for "qualified domestic relations orders" that permitted enforcement of
state-court decrees that allocated pension assets. ERISA §§ 206(d)(3) and 514(b)(7). Secondly, REAct
required that pension plans establish survivorship interests in pension assets of the participant for the
benefit of a nonemployee spouse. ERISA § 205.
212 Dorothy's 1980 testamentary transfer, which is the source of respondents' claimed
ownership interest, is a prohibited "assignment or alienation." An "assignment or
alienation" has been defined by regulation ... as "[a]ny direct or indirect arrange-
ment whereby a party acquires from a participant or beneficiary" an interest en,
forceable against a plan to "all or any part of a plan benefits payment which is, or
may become, payable to the participant or beneficiary .... Those requirements are
met. Under Louisiana law community property interests are enforceable against a
plan .... If respondents' claims were allowed to succeed they would have acquired,
as of 1980, an interest in Isaac's pension plan at the expense of plan participants and
beneficiaries.
Boggs, 520 U.S. at 851-52.2
""The surviving spouse annuity and QDRO provisions, which acknowledge and protect specific
pension plan community property interests, give rise to the strong implication that other community
property claims are not consistent with the statutory scheme." Id. at 847. The dissent took issue with the
majority's implicit application of the maxim expressio unius exclusio altetius. Id. at 866-68 (5-4 decision)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Annuity and even though Isaac himself could have diverted up to 50% of it.
The majority also found an implied conflict to ban Dorothy's testamentary
transfer of subsequently distributed pension benefits. ERISA § 206(d) cer-
tainly prohibited Dorothy's testamentary transfer of her community interest
in the Savings Plan and AT&T Stock during Isaac's lifetime; there was no
mandate to extend that prohibition to the post-distribution assets after
Isaac's death. What the Court gave the states in Travelers by tightening its
analysis of "relate to," it appeared to have taken away in Boggs with its wide-
ranging conflict preemption analysis.2i4
The Court's preemption analysis remains confused. On the one hand, it
has given up trying to find meaning in the expression "relate to." Beginning
in Travelers the Court refocused at least the "connection with" half of its
preemption analysis on the objectives of ERISA, the structure of the statute
(including its scope), and the nature of the effect of the state law. Now a law
has a connection with ERISA only when it mandates benefit structures or
affects the administration of benefits. The Court has, however, arguably left
intact the "refer to" half of the test by its repeated reiterations, although in
no case has "refer to" been necessary to the Court's holding. On the other
hand, the Court demonstrated a vigorous application of traditional conflict
preemption in Boggs. A state statute exempting both IRAs and retirement
benefits subject to ERISA presents none of the complexities of Louisiana
community property law. Given the Court's care not to find preemption in
Travelers and the lack of conflict preemption with respect to IRAs that are
excluded from Title I of ERISA, a state statute blending exemptions for both
retirement benefits and retirement savings should not be preempted as it ap-
plies to IRAs.
3. Would ERISA § 514(a) preempt a
blended state statute exempting both IRAs No.
and retirement plans subject to ERISA?
sa
4Preemption cases since Boggs have added little to the picture. In the companion case of De Buono v.
NYSA-ILA Med. and Clinical Serv. Fund, 520 U.S. 806 (1997), the Court easily applied Travelers to hold
that a state tax on gross receipts of health care facilities was not preempted. In Egelhoff the Court unani-
mously held that a law of the State of Washington providing for automatic revocation upon divorce of
beneficiary designations of a spouse in life insurance policies and for pension plans was preempted. Egel.
hoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001). The Court reaffirmed its narrower application of "relate to" in UNUM Life
Ins. Co. of America v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 378-79 (1999). See also Kentucky Ass'n, supra note 122
(dropping previous incorporation of tests of McCarran-Ferguson Act into ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A) and thus
further decreasing scope of preemption of state regulation of managed care plans) and In re Weinhoeft, 275
F.3d 604, 605 (7th Cir. 2001) ('To the extent that this statute [Illinois' statute blending exemptions for
ERISA-qualified plans and IRAs] speaks to pensions regulated by ERISA it is preempted (but redundant);
to the extent it deals with individual retirement accounts ... and other assets outside the scope of ERISA,
it is not preempted .... ").
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V. ERISA PREEMPTION AND VIRGINIA EXEMPTION LAW
Individual retirement accounts cannot be excluded from the bankruptcy
estate under Bankruptcy Code § 541(c)(2). They are protected neither by an
enforceable federal anti-alienation provision nor the common law of spend-
thrift trusts. Any protection of IRAs from creditors must be found in an
exemption provision. Virginia, like most other states, has opted out of the
federal exemptions. Bankruptcy Code § 522(d)(10)(E) is thus unavailable.
Like most states that have opted out of the federal exemptions, Virginia has
acted to protect a variety of retirement assets. VA. CODE § 34-34 provides
two levels of protection for IRAs. If a Virginia resident has no pension as-
sets subject to ERISA, then all amounts held in an IRA are exempt. 215 For
those who have an interest in an employer-sponsored retirement plan, includ-
ing an ERISA-qualified pension, there is a limited IRA exemption. 216 In such
a situation, an individual's 217 interest in a retirement plan (which is expressly
defined to include IRAs)2 18 is exempt to the extent that the cumulative an-
nual benefits from all plans at retirement will not exceed $17,500.2 19 Vir-
ginia's collation of benefits from all retirement plans for calculation of the
exempt portion of IRAs is unique.220 Other states have exempted IRAs
along with retirement assets subject to ERISA and courts have concluded in
a few cases that such blended exemptions are preempted by ERISA.221 But
21A retirement plan established pursuant to §§ 408 and 408 A of the Internal Revenue Code is
exempt to the same extent as that permitted under federal law for a qualified plan established pursuant to
§ 401 of the Internal Revenue Code" VA. CODE ANN. § 34-34(H) (Michie Supp. 2002).
216 However, an individual who claims an exemption under federal law for any retire-
ment plan established pursuant to §§ 401, 403 (a), 403 (b), 409 or § 457 of the
Internal Revenue Code shall not be entitled to claim the exemption under this
subsection for a retirement plan established pursuant to § 408 or § 408 A of the
Internal Revenue Code.
Id.
2 17
"The exemption provided by this section shall be available whether such individual has an interest
in the retirement plan as a participant, beneficiary, contingent annuitant, alternate payee, or otherwise."
VA. CODE. ANN. § 34-34(B) (Michie Supp. 2002).
2
"
8 
'Retirement plan' means a plan, account, or arrangement that is intended to satisfy the require-
ments of United States Internal Revenue Code §§ 401, 403 (a), 403 (b), 408, 408A, 409 . or § 457."
VA. CODE. ANN. § 34-34(A) (Michie Supp. 2002).
219 The exemption provided under subsection B shall not apply to the extent that the
interest of the individual in the retirement plan would provide an annual benefit in
excess of $17,500. If an individual has an interest in more than one retirement plan,
the limitation of this subsection C shall be applied as if all such retirement plans
constituted a single plan.
VA. CODE ANN. § 34-34(C) (Michie Supp. 2002). Other limitations on exemption of IRAs include
amounts contributed in the two years previous to the claim of exemption (other than rollovers from
another exempt plan) and claims by an alternate payee or the Commonwealth of Virginia. VA. CODE
ANN. § 34-34(E) (Michie Supp. 2002).22
°See infra Appendix.
221See infra Appendix.
AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL
it is Virginia's integration of the amount of a debtor's IRA exemption with
the amount of the debtor's ERISA-governed retirement account that renders
its exemption law particularly vulnerable to preemption. And it was this
integration that the Gurry and Bissell courts considered.
A. ROUND 1 - No PREEMPTION
Stephen Gurry was the beneficiary of an ERISA-qualified 401(k) pension
plan through his employment with CMS Information Services. 222 Gurry
scheduled his 401(k) plan at $61,000 but noted that it was excluded from the
property of his estate.223 He also individually owned an IRA worth $61,000
and jointly with his wife held a second IRA scheduled at $7,400.224
Gurry asserted that both of his IRAs were entirely exempt under § 34-
34(H) notwithstanding the statute's further specification that IRAs enjoyed
only a limited exemption when a debtor was also the beneficiary of a 401(k)
plan. Gurry's strongest argument went to preemption. He pointed out that
Virginia's exemption statute defined 'retirement plan" explicitly to include
plans governed by ERISA 225 and that the statute incorporated ERISA-quali-
fied plans into the IRA exemption formula.226 Given the historic breadth of
ERISA preemption, it did not seem far-fetched to conclude that the exemp-
tion statute "related to" an employee benefit plan within the meaning of ER-
ISA. Rather than conducting an exhaustive analysis of the Supreme Court's
ERISA jurisprudence, the bankruptcy court turned to several Circuit Court
cases and a Kansas Supreme Court decision to guide its preemption analysis.
Custer v. Sweeney,227 a 1996 Fourth Circuit opinion that failed to cite
Travelers, held that ERISA did not preempt a malpractice claim against an
attorney for a pension plan. Raymond Sweeney was the nephew of the presi-
dent of the Sheet Metal Workers' International Association who also served
as chairman of the union's affiliated pension fund.228 Sweeney was one of the
attorneys for the pension plan and, according to the complaint, committed
legal malpractice by allowing the plan to fund a jet for his uncle's private use
222Gurry, 253 BR. 406, 409 n.2 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2000).
223Id. at 408-09.
2 2 4
1d.
225VA. CODE ANN. § 34-34(A) (Michie Supp. 2002) supra note 218.
226 Although § 34-34(A) defines "retirement plan" in such a way as include 401(k)
plans, and although § 34-34(C) provides that "if an individual has an interest in
more than one retirement plan," the $17,500 annual benefit limitation "shall be
applied as if all such retirement plans constituted a single plan," the debtors argue
that the $61,000 in Mr. Curry's 401(k) plan cannot be considered in calculating the
exempt amount of the IRAs .... This is so, the debtors say, for the simple reason
that ERISA completely preempts state law.
Gurry, 253 B.R. at 411.
22789 F.3d 1156 (4th Cir. 1996).
22Sld. at 1160.
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and to purchase a lavish mansion as his uncle's home.229 Sweeney sought a
dismissal of the action against him on the ground that the civil enforcement
provisions of ERISA completely displaced the claim. 230 The Fourth Circuit
refused to order the dismissal of Custer's case with prejudice, holding that
the malpractice claim did not "relate to" ERISA.23' The decision made use of
footnote 21 in Shaw ("[s]ome state actions may affect employee benefit plans
in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner" to be preempted) 232 but did
not refer to Travelers. The court distinguished Ingersoll-Rand by relying on
Justice O'Connor's alternative holding, i.e., that allowing actions for wrongful
termination to avoid paying pension benefits would subject plan sponsors to
conflicting state requirements.233  A suit against the plan's attorney, the
court reasoned, would have no such impact on plan sponsors. While the
Fourth Circuit may have ignored that portion of the Court's holding in Inger-
soil-Rand that stressed that impact on the plan was not necessary for preemp-
tion,234 its ultimate conclusion was nonetheless consistent with the Court's
Travelers decision. There was no reason to believe that permitting a mal-
practice claim against a plan's attorney would undermine the purposes of ER-
ISA or have an economic impact on plan administration, the twin
perspectives of Travelers preemption analysis.235 The bankruptcy court in
Gurry reached the same conclusion with respect to limited exemption of
IRAs: the integrative Virginia statute did "not burden or infringe upon the
Federal statutory scheme."236
Yet the Virginia exemption statute is more intertwined with ERISA
than the situation presented in Custer v. Sweeney. VA. CODE § 34-34(H)
requires a determination of the extent of an individual's qualified pension
benefits and a concomitant reduction in the exemption of the amount of his
or her IRA that can be exempted. The Gurry court turned to the pre-Trav-
2 29
Id"
2
3
0 d. at 1164 (Tor his 'complete preemption' argument, Sweeney contends that Custer's malpractice
claim falls 'squarely within' ERISA's civil enforcement provision, § 502 .. . because, even if prosecuted
against non-fiduciaries, the claim 'purports to remedy harm arising out of breaches of ERISA fiduciary
duties.').
231 [W]e do not believe that Congress intended ERISA to preempt state law malprac-
tice claims involving professional services to ERISA plans. ERISA does not evince
a clear legislative purpose to preempt such traditional state-based laws of general
applicability, and permitting Custer's claim would not undermine the congressional
policies that underlie ERISA.
Id. at 1167.
232Id. at 1166.
233See supra text accompanying note 156.
254See supra text accompanying note 159.
255See supra text accompanying notes 177-78.
216Gurry, 253 BR. 406, 411 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2000).
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elers Third Circuit decision in Keystone v. Foley237 for a rationale to avoid
preemption even here. A Pennsylvania statute provided that all workers on a
public contract must be paid "the minimum prevailing wage."238 Second, reg-
ulations implementing the act provided that both cash and benefits must be
taken into account to determine the prevailing minimum wage rate.239 Third,
an administrative order interpreting the regulations distinguished between
ERISA benefits (which presumptively counted toward the calculation of
whether an employer was paying the prevailing wage) and other benefits that
were subject to administrative review. 240 The Third Circuit concluded that
ERISA preempted the administrative order because it singled out ERISA
plans for automatically favorable treatment.241 However, the Court of Ap-
peals held that ERISA preempted neither the underlying statute nor the im-
plementing regulations because they required only that wages and benefits be
taken into account to determine the prevailing wage; the statute and regula-
tions did not mandate any particular form of benefits or that the employer
pay any benefits at all.242 Neither the statute nor the regulations singled out
ERISA plans for special treatment: "they merely refer[ed] to employee bene-
fits, with no distinction between ERISA and non-ERISA benefits."243
The Virginia exemption statute's calculations, however, do more than
"merely refer to" ERISA benefits. So for its final supporting precedent the
Gurry court looked to Lawrence Paper v. Gomez,244 a decision of the Kansas
Supreme Court. Kansas's worker compensation law required employers to
pay a percentage of an injured employee's "average weekly wage." Certain
ERISA-governed benefits were mandated to be included in the calculation of
2 57Keystone Chapter, Associated Builders & Contractors v. Foley, 37 F.3d 945 (3d Cir. 1994).23SKeystone, 37 F.3d at 950 ("The purpose of the Prevailing Wage Act 'is to protect workers em-
ployed on public projects from substandard wages by insuring that they receive the prevailing minimum
wage. '") (citation omitted).
2391d. ('The regulations make clear that a prevailing minimum wage will state a cash wage and a level
of benefits contributions as separate components.").
24°1d. at 952 (-[T]he Declaratory Order establishes that any contribution to an ERISA plan is per se
bona fide, while other benefits contributions must be certified by the Division as such.").
241Id. at 955 (-The District Court correctly held that ERISA preempts the Declaratory Order, be-
cause it singles out [ERISA] plans for special treatment.").
242 [W]e hold that neither the Prevailing Wage Act nor its accompanying regulations
are preempted. Under at least one reasonable interpretation of the Act and regula-
tions, an interpretation the Agency is free to adopt, the Act and regulations merely
require that the Secretary set a prevailing wage that consists of a cash component
and may include a benefits component. Employers must pay the cash component of
the wage in cash, but they may pay the benefits component either in benefits or
cash. Any benefits they provide, regardless of type, would count toward the bene-
fits component.
Id. at 956.
2431d. at 956-57.
24 4Lawrence Paper Co. v. Gomez, 897 P.2d 134 (Kan. 1995).
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the average weekly wage.2 45 An employer sought a declaratory judgment
that the Kansas statute was preempted under Board of Trade because "[t]he
benefit levels of the Kansas Workers Compensation Act are tied directly to
the monetary value of the ERISA-covered plans furnished by plaintiff."2 46
The court rejected this argument, holding that it is only the effect of the
statute on an ERISA covered plan that generates preemption.247 If ERISA
benefits could be used to increase a workers compensation award, the Gurry
court reasoned, then ERISA benefits could be used to decrease the IRA ex-
emption without risk of preemption.248
B. ROUND 2 - SAVED FROM PREEMPTION
The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia provided a second
perspective on the application of § 34-34 to IRAs in bankruptcy in Phillips v.
Bottoms (In re Bottoms). 249 Although the decision in Bottoms was published
three weeks after Bissell, it nowhere mentions the Bissell decision. Bottoms
does, however, cite Gurry with approval. 25 0  The opinion affirmed an unre-
ported decision of the bankruptcy court that ERISA did not preempt §'34-
34 because the exemption statute "did 'not conflict with ERISA either di-
rectly or indirectly."25" The court implicitly affirmed that § 34-34 did not
relate to ERISA under the Travelers reformulation of the "connection with"
245Id. at 138 ('The Kansas Legislature ... elected to define an employee's compensation broadly to
include fringe benefits such as employer-paid insurance, profit-sharing, and pension contributions.").
246
Id. at 140.
247 We do not read Washington Board of Trade as requiring preemption merely on the
basis that a statute refers to ERISA benefits or plans. Each of the circuit courts in
Guidry, Foley, Minn, Chapter, and Combined Mgt. carefully examined the actual
effect of the challenged state law on any ERISA covered plans to decide whether
preemption was required.
Id. at 142.
248 The Virginia statute in question does not, in its application to IRAs, affect the
calculation of benefits to the debtor or any other participant in the ERISA-qualified
401(k), nor does it otherwise impact the administration of that plan or impose any
obligations or burdens on the employer or plan participants.
Gurry, 253 BR. 406, 412 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2000).
249260 BR. 393 (E.D. Va. 2000). Accord Abbate, 289 B.R. 62 (E.D. Va. 2003).
25
°Bottoms, 260 B.R. at 399 ("The treatment accorded the issue [of preemption] in Gurry, of course,
amounts to the finding that section 34-34 is not preempted. And, of particular note, is the part of that
thoughtful analysis which supports the unarticulated premise that nothing in section 34-34 of the Virginia
Code conflicts with ERISA.").
2
'Bottoms, 260 BR. at 396 (E.D. Va. 2000) (quoting Phillips v. Bottoms (In re Bottoms), Ch. 7 Case
No. 98-33413-T, mem. op. at 6 (Bankr. E.D. Va. March 2, 1999)). The Bankruptcy Court had buttressed
its bare conclusion with the following reasoning that the District Court quoted with approval: "Virginia
Code § 34-34 neither acts immediately and exclusively upon an employee benefit plan under ERISA nor is
the existence of ERISA plans essential to section 34-34's operation. ERISA serves a mere definitional
purpose for the Virginia exemption and [§ 34-34] is thus not preempted by ERISA." Bottoms, 260 BR. at
397.
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gloss. It further concluded that § 34-34 did not "refer to" ERISA by noting
that the Supreme Court in Dillingham had held that it is only "[w]here a
State's law acts immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans, as in
Mackey, or where the existence of ERISA plans is essential to the [State]
law's operation, as in Greater Washington Bd. of Trade and Ingersoll-Rand,
that 'reference to' will result in preemption." 252 "Reference to" means more
than mention of ERISA in a state law: where "ERISA serves a mere defini-
tional purpose ... [it is] not preempted by ERISA.'"' 253
Going beyond concluding there was no preemption of the exemption stat-
ute, the court in lengthy dicta laid the foundation for application of ERISA
§ 514(d)254 to preserve § 34-34 in any event. Any use of ERISA § 514(d)'s
savings clause must recur to the Supreme Court's decision in Shaw. 25 5 The
Court had saved that portion of New York's Human Rights Law concerning
state administrative remedies for violations of the federal Title VII when it
held that preemption of the state statute "would impair Title VII to the
extent that the Human Rights Law provides a means of enforcing Title VII's
commands."256 Title VII directs persons who believe that an employer has
violated their rights to proceed first to exhaust their state-law administrative
remedies. 257 If ERISA preempted the Human Rights Law in its entirety,
then primary jurisdiction over employment rights violations would fall to the
EEOC, which would both eliminate the EEOC's power of reference and in-
crease its workload. 258 The Bottoms court extended this reasoning to include
state exemption laws which are accorded a place in the bankruptcy system
by Bankruptcy Code § 522(b).259 While the court admitted that preemption
of state exemption law would not have the same impact on bankruptcy
courts as would have preemption of the Human Rights Law on the EEOC, it
252Id. (quoting Dillingham, 519 U.S. 316, 324-25 (1997)).
253Bottomrs, 260 B.R. at 398 (quoting Phillips v. Bottoms (In re Bottoms), Ch. 7 Case No. 98-33413-T,
mem. op. at 6 (Bankr. E.D. Va. March 2, 1999)).
2 4
"Nothing in this title shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any
law of the United States ... or any rule or regulation issued under any such law." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d).
2 55See supra text accompanying notes 135-39.
256Shaw, 463 U.S. 85, 102 (1983). The Shaw Court had used the savings clause found at ERISA
§ 514(b) to preserve New York's Disability Law from preemption. See supTa text accompanying note 139.
257 Title VII requires recourse to available state administrative remedies. When an
employment practice prohibited by Title VII is alleged to have occurred in a State
or locality which prohibits the practice and has established an agency to enforce
that prohibition, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) refers
the charges to the state agency.
Id. at 101-02.
25Sld. at 102 n.23 ("Pre-emption of this sort not only would eliminate a forum for resolving disputes
that, in certain situations, may be more convenient than the EEOC, but also would substantially increase
the EEOC's "workload.").
215 See supra text accompanying note 78.
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held that it "is clear ... that the states play an important role in the joint
federal-state [bankruptcy] scheme envisioned by Congress."260 Based on this
argument, the court held that ERISA § 514(d) saved §34-34 from
preemption.261
The Bottoms court dealt only with a trustee's attack on the limited ex-
emption of § 34-34(B); it did not deal with the implications of the later 1999
amendment codified at § 34-34(H), which granted an unlimited exemption to
holders of IRAs except in cases where they also had a qualified pension
fund.262 While the court's reasoning was expansive, it did not address that
aspect of § 34-34 which the Bissell court was to take up.
C. ROUND 3 - PREEMPTION
The Bissell court clearly had Gurry in view when it concluded that ERISA
preempted that portion of § 34-34(H) which limited the amount of an IRA
that could be exempted where qualified pension fund' were also available. 263
The Bissell court was acutely aware that preemption of the entirety of the
exemption statute would leave debtors with no exemption at all for IRAs.
Yet references to ERISA pervaded the law; if ERISA preempted some of
§ 34-34, it would be difficult to salvage any of it.264
Bissell began its exemption analysis by turning first to the definition of
2
"Bottoms, 260 B.R. 393, 403 (E.D. Va. 2000). See supra text accompanying notes 249-51 for an
evaluation of this conclusion.
26'Bottoms, 260 BR. at 403 ([S]ection 514(d) of ERISA saves section 34,34 of the Virginia Code
from the preemptive effect of section 514(a)."). The district court's opinion also included analysis of deci-
sions of four circuit courts of appeals concerning the same issue. See infra text accompanying notes 306-25.
26 2The Bottoms filed their Chapter 7 case sometime prior to June 11, 1998, the date of their creditors'
meeting. Bottoms, 260 BR. at 394. Their filing was thus well in advance of the addition of § 34-34(H),
which mandated integration. Both the Gurrys and the Bissells filed after § 34-34(H) became effective.
26 3The Bissell opinion gave a perfunctory citation to Gury in a footnote after having contrasted the
creditor's use of § 34-34 approach unfavorably with accepted Virginia bankruptcy practice:
The creditor's interpretation of § 34-34 is contrary to the commonly accepted prac-
tice. Statewide continuing legal education seminars treat ERISA-qualified pension
plans and IRAs separately .... Debtors routinely compute the exemption under
§ 34-34 without regard to the amount of any ERISA-qualified pension plan which
is excluded from the bankruptcy estate by virtue of § 541(c)(2). Historically,
neither chapter 7 trustees nor creditors objected to this method of calculation.
In re Bissell, 255 B.R. 402, 406 (Bankr. E.D. 2000).
264 The definition of "retirement plan" in § 34,34(A) must either include ERISA-quali-
fled pension plans or exclude them. If they are included within the definition, the
statute would "relate to" ERISA-qualified pension plans and federal preemption
must be considered. The effect of preemption may be harsher than expected. Sec-
tion 34-34 could be preempted in its entirety, leaving no IRA exemption. It is,
therefore, necessary to construe § 34-34 to determine whether ERISA-qualified
pension plans are included within the statutory definition of'retirement plans" and,
if so, the effect of federal preemption; or, whether ERISA-qualified pension plans
are excluded from the statutory definition.
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"retirement plan." The opinion acknowledged that "at first blush" § 34-
34(A) included on its face benefits subject to ERISA within the broad scope
of retirement plans. 265 The court quickly concluded that the entire statute
would be preempted if it meant what it said. Like the opinion in Curry, the
preemption analysis in Bissell failed to take into account the Supreme Court
decisions from Travelers to the present. Unlike the opinion in Curry, the
Bissell preemption analysis led to a systemic distortion of ERISA's impact on
Virginia's exemption statute.
The Bissell opinion cited several Supreme Court cases including Shaw for
the older "connection with or reference to" gloss on the relate to test of
preemption.266 However, Bissell omitted any reference to the recognition by
the Travelers Court that "our prior attempt to construe the phrase 'relate to'
does not give us much help drawing the line here."267 The opinion did not
use the purpose-driven exemption paradigm the Court provided in Trav-
elers.268 Nor did the opinion discuss the increased deference paid to matters
involving the exercise of the historic police powers by the states enunciated
in Travelers.269 The decision overlooked the Supreme Court's careful effort
to avoid preemption in Dillingham.270 Nor did the opinion recur to the
venerable "refers to" half of the Shaw gloss, which arguably survived
whatever changes Travelers and its progeny have wrought.271
The opinion in Bissell instead turned to principles of statutory construc-
tion to eliminate the risk of preemption of § 34-34 in its entirety caused by
the breadth of the definition of "retirement plan" in § 34-34(A) and to pre-
serve the first paragraph of the unlimited IRA exemption of § 34-34(H). The
statutory definition does, of course, include plans intended to satisfy IRC
§ 401 among the list of retirement plans. Reading § 34-34(A) to include
pension plans subject to ERISA would, according to the Bissell ahalysis, re-
sult in automatic preemption of the entirety of the IRA exemption statute.2 72
265See supra note 216 (quoting § 34-34(A)). The court's use of the phrase "at first blush" is reminis-
cent of Justice Souter's turn of phrase in Travelers ("one might be excused for wondering, at first blush,
whether the words of limitation ('insofar as they ... relate') do much limiting."). Travelers, 514 U.S. 645,
655 (1995). This makes the lack of any reference to Travelers in Bissell all the more perplexing.
266Bissell, 255 B.R. at 407 ("A law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the
phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.").
267 Travelers, 514 U.S. at 655.
26SSee supra text accompanying notes 185-86 and 252.
269See supra text accompanying note 186.
170 See supra text accompanying notes 187-90.
17 iThe decision in Bissell properly makes use of Mackey but only for the unobjectionable proposition
that state laws can neither permit the alienation of ERISA-qualified pension plans nor "add protections for
debtors not contained in ERISA." Bissell, 255 B.R. at 407-08. The Bissell court did not address the
implications of the Supreme Court's detailed conflict preemption analysis in Boggs, probably because they
would have proved unfruitful in its efforts to preserve an "un-integrated" IRA exemption.
272Id. at 418 ("Here, 'a literal construction of the statute would yield an absurd result' - that the very
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Citing several cases for the proposition that "construction of a statute that
renders a statute unconstitutional must be eschewed in favor of a construc-
tion that upholds the validity of a statute," Bissell concluded that the same
principle of statutory construction should be employed in the face of possible
preemption.273 No Virginia case stands for the extension of this rule of statu-
tory construction.274 And even if there were such a rule of construction, it
seems unlikely that it could be applied meaningfully in the face of the unam-
biguous inclusion of pension plans subject to ERISA in the definition of re-
tirement plans. 275
The Bissell opinion augments the argument for its narrowing interpreta-
tion of the definition of retirement plan by turning to the history of § 34-34.
The opinion points out that in 1999 the Virginia legislature was concerned
to equalize treatment of retirement benefits when it enacted § 34-34(H). 276
According to the court's understanding of § 34-34(H), IRAs should have an
comprehensiveness of the statute causes its invalidity, that is, to be preempted and of no force or effect.")
(quoting Earley v. Landsidle, 514 S.E.2d 153 (1999) which held that it was not absurd to interpret a
statute permitting the Attorney General to seek a declaration of the constitutionality of state law to
prohibit the Attorney General from challenging a state law on the ground that it was unconstitutional.)273Bissell, 255 B.R. at 418 (citing Earley v. Landsidle, supra note 272, and Virginia Socy for Human
Life, Inc. v. Caldwell, 500 S.E.2d 814 (1998)).
2 7 4 See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Pettit, 164 F.3d 857 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that ERISA
preempted state law constructive trust claim); Saturn Distribution Corp. v. Williams, 905 F.2d 719 (4th
Cir. 1990) (holding that portions of Virginia's Motor Dealer Licensing Act were preempted by the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act); and WBQ P'ship v. Virginia (In re WBQ P'ship), 189 BR. 97 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1995) (holding that a statutory successor liability rule was preempted by Bankruptcy Code § 363(o). The
only case declining to find preemption in light of statutory construction is W.M. Schlosser Co. v. School
Bd. of Fairfax County, 980 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1992) which held that the Federal Arbitration Act did not
preempt Virginia's rule of strict statutory construction concerning the powers of local governing bodies
(the so-called Dillon Rule). The conclusion of non-preemption" did not, however, involve any narrowing
construction of state law. See also Holland v. Holland, 53 Va. Cir. 512, 1999 WL 262433 (1999) (holding
that the Social Security Act's anti-alienation provision does not preempt a state court from considering
funds in an account derived from Social Security payments in making an equitable distribution of a marital
estate).
27 The Bissell opinion seeks to avoid the argument that its construction of § 34-34 renders the stat-
ute's references to IRC § 401 as surplusage: "[e]xcluding ERISA-qualified pension plans from the statu-
tory definition of 'retirement plans' does not render the reference to 26 U.S.C. § 401 in § 34-34(H) of the
Code of Virginia meaningless. There are § 401 plans that are not ERISA-qualified." Bissell, 255 B.R. at
421 n.22. This construction seems unfounded. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-34(H) gives no hint that its refer-
ence to IRC § 401 was intended to apply to only a few rather than all plans qualified under that section.
It is also inconsistent with § 34-34(A), which contains a broad reference to IRC § 401 in its definition of
retirement plan. The Bissell court admits as much when it notes that "Section 34-34 is not limited to
ERISA-qualified pension plans." Id. at 420. While § 34-34 is not limited to retirement plans subject to
ERISA, it certainly includes them. Moreover, nothing in the Report of the Joint Subcommittee Studying
Virginia's Exemption Statutes, H. 77 (Va. 1990) [hereinafter, the Report], supports the Bissell court's
construction (quoted in Bissell, 255 B.R. at 420).276Bissell, 255 B.R. at 418 ("This change [the addition of § 43-43(H)] partially corrected the disparate
treatment of different beneficiaries, a disparate treatment similar to that which the Subcommittee identi-
fied in 1990.") and at 420 (eThe General Assembly sought to eliminate the inequality between 401 plans
and IRAs by extending to IRAs the same exemption as a 401 plan.").
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unlimited exemption because ERISA-qualified pension plans enjoyed com-
plete exclusion from the bankruptcy estate.277 Any limitation on the unlim-
ited exemption of IRAs struck the court as contradicting the legislature's
fundamental intention to treat all retirement benefits equally:
Just as in 1990, [in 1999] there was a disparate treatment of
beneficiaries. For example, two individuals, each with
$100,000 in a retirement fund, could be treated very differ-
ently. A debtor who is 54 years old when he files a petition
in bankruptcy is entitled to claim $52,955 in an IRA exempt.
The remaining $47,045 is not exempt. Another debtor with
an ERISA-qualified pension plan would retain the entire
$100,000 retirement fund .... There was no good policy
reason to favor one type of employment over another. 278
The court's policy analysis is perfectly sound.279 Unfortunately, both the
Bankruptcy Code and ERISA make the very distinction that Bissell decries.
Section 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code works to exclude ERISA-qualified
plans from the estate in their entirety. With respect to IRAs, Bankruptcy
Code § 522(d)(10)(E) limits their exemption to an amount reasonably neces-
sary for support. 280 The limitation on the amount of an IRA that can be
exempted under Virginia law can best be understood simply as a formulaic
adaptation of the discretionary federal exemption for IRAs under the Bank-
ruptcy Code.281
It appears that the goal of the Virginia legislature with the pre-Patterson
enactment of § 34-34 in 1990 was to create an across-the-board exemption
for all retirement benefits of an amount that it believed was reasonable. 282
277Bissell, 255 B.R. at 419 ("It [VA. CODE ANN. § 34-34(H)] explicitly acknowledges that ERISA-
qualified plans are exempt pursuant to federal law. IRAs are exempt 'to the same extent as that permitted
under federal law' for 401(k) plans.").2751d. at 418.
279See The Pension Shield, supra note 74.
2S°See supra text accompanying notes 74-75, 281.
28 The Bottoms court reached the same conclusion:
[A]though the federal bankruptcy provision permits exemption of a payment under
a pension "to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any
dependent of the debtor," 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E) (emphasis added), Virginia has
enacted an alternative exemption provision, found in section 34-34 of the Virginia
Code. The state provision, like the federal one it replaces, limits the exemption of
retirement benefits. However, rather than limiting the exemption to "the extent
reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor" and his dependents, the Vir-
ginia law provides instead that the exemption 'shall not apply to the extent that
the interest of the individual in the retirement plan would provide an annual benefit
in excess of $17,500."
Bottoms, 260 B.R. 363, 402 (E.D. Va. 2000).
2 2Nothing in the Report expressly describes the rationale for the limitation on exemption of retire-
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With the decision in Patterson v. Shumate, creditors and bankruptcy trustees
had no access at all to any qualified pension benefits. Thus in 1999, presuma-
bly from a sense of fairness, the Virginia legislature added § 34-34(H) and
exempted IRAs in full. Yet the overall goal of limiting the exemption for
retirement benefits to a reasonable amount remained. The 1999 amendment
realized this goal in part by linking the full exemption of IRAs to the pres-
ence of employer-sponsored retirement benefits. While the legislature
wanted fairness, it had not lost its desire for reasonableness and thus removed
the unlimited exemption for IRAs by requiring integration when an em-
ployer-sponsored retirement benefit plan (including those subject to ERISA)
was present. The debtor in such a case would be remitted to the limited
exemption of § 34-34(C), which is what Virginia would provide for all debt-
ors but for ERISA and Patterson.28 3
VI. ERISA PREEMPTION AND OTHER STATES' EXEMPTION
STATUTES
The battle over preemption of Virginia's exemption statute has not oc-
curred in a vacuum. Although Virginia's exemption of IRAs is more recon-
dite than that of any other state, judicial construction of other efforts is
helpful in framing the issues surrounding Virginia's efforts and predicting
whether the Supreme Court would find preemption in any case. Beginning
shortly after Mackey, there was a modest wave of bankruptcy court decisions
holding that ERISA preempted state exemption laws applicable to retirement
plans. Such decisions were questioned by other bankruptcy courts, and be-
ginning well before Travelers, several Courts of Appeals found no cause for
preemption. Since Travelers, no case other than Bissell has found preemption.
ment plans. A recital in the legislation creating the Joint Committee, however, mentions that "other
states, such as Texas, Michigan and Illinois, have enacted statutes expressly exempting qualified retire-
ment plans from creditors' claims subject to certain restrictions or conditions." HJ.R. 284, 1989 Gen. As-
sem. (Va. 1989) (emphasis added.). None of the states referenced in the Report contained any limitation
on the amount of an IRA that could be exempted under that state's law.
2
.The Bissell court presents a scenario that it believes demonstrates the absurdity of this conclusion:
It is not difficult to imagine a situation where a debtor has an IRA with a value of
$100,000 and an ERISA-qualified pension plan with a value of $100. The [ob-
jecting] creditor's construction would inevitably lead to the conclusion that the
IRA may not be claimed as exempt under § 34-34(H) because of the existence of
the nominal ERISA-qualified pension plan. While the debtor would be able to avail
himself of the limited exemption under § 34-34(B), the General Assembly's intent
to place IRAs and ERISA-qualified pension plans on an equal footing would be
frustrated.
Bissell, 255 B.R. at 422. The Bissell court presumes that the legislature's intent of equal treatment
supercedes its goal of limited exemption, the very conclusion it seeks to demonstrate.
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A. CONFLICTS AMONG THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS
Until the Supreme Court's 1988 decision in Mackey striking down Geor-
gia's prohibition of garnishment of welfare plan benefits, 28 4 no lower court
had held that state law exemptions of retirement funds (ERISA-qualified or
not) were preempted. Within a year after Mackey, several bankruptcy courts
in Texas applied Mackey to preempt state exemption laws. The first reported
bankruptcy case on this issue, In re Komet,285 considered the Texas statute
that exempted a wide variety of retirement assets including ERISA-qualified
plans. 286 The debtors in Komet owned retirement assets subject to ERISA,
which they claimed as exempt under Texas law.28 7 According to the court,
this statute exempting ERISA-qualified plans "related to" and "referred to"
ERISA, both of which phenomena were sufficient to preempt the statute.288
The bankruptcy court did not pause to consider whether Mackey's language
2S4See supra text accompanying note 147.
...ln re Komet, 93 BR. 498 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988), modified on mot. for reconsideration by In re
Komet, 104 B.R. 799 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989). The modifications in the second Komet opinion went to
whether the assets were exempt under Bankruptcy Code § 522(b)(2)(A). The court reiterated its earlier
conclusion that ERISA preempted the Texas statute: "It is simply not possible to evade the clear mandate
that a law which 'makes reference to' an ERISA plan faces pre-emption under Section 514(a)." Komet, 104
B.R. at 801.
..
6Komet, 93 BR. at 499 ("At issue here is the debtors' asserted exemption of a $100,000 pension plan
and a $140,00 profit sharing plan, both claimed under a newly adopted Texas exemption statute which
renders virtually all types of qualified retirement plans exempt from execution.").
287 In addition to the exemptions prescribed by Section 42.001, a person's right to the
assets held in or to receive payments, whether vested or not, under a stock bonus,
pension, profit-sharing, or similar plan, including a retirement plan for self-employed
individuals, or under an individual retirement account or individual retirement an-
nuity, including a simplified employee pension plan is exempt from attachment, exe-
cution, and seizure for the satisfaction of debts unless the plan, contract, or account
does not qualify under the applicable provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986. A person's right to the assets held in or to receive payments, whether vested
or not, under a government or church plan or contract is also exempt unless the
plan or contract does not qualify under the definition of a government or church
plan under the applicable provisions of the Federal Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974.
TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.0021 (Vernon 1988).
288 It is manifest to this court that the language in the first sentence of the Texas
statute, "unless the plan does not qualify under the applicable provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code," implicates and incorporates ERISA, and thus "relates to"
ERISA plans .... The second sentence of the Texas statute expressly refers to and
exempts all government or church plans if they qualify under ERISA. This express
reference is alone enough to cause its preemption.
Konet, 93 BR. at 500. Accord In re Sellers, 107 BR. 152 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1989) (applying Tennessee
law to ERISA-qualified plans); In re Gaines, 106 B.R. 1008 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989) (applying Missouri
law to ERISA-qualified plan and IRA); In re Sheppard, 106 B.R. 724 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989) (applying
Florida law to ERISA-qualified plans); Penick v. Hirsch (In re Hirsch), 98 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1988)
(applying Arizona law to ERISA-qualified plans); In re Brown, 95 BR. 216 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1989)
(applying Oklahoma law to ERISA-qualified plans); Heitkamp v. Dyke (In re Dyke), 99 B.R. 343, 349
ROCK, SCISSORS, PAPER
about "reference to" and "relate to" was broader than its actual holding.28 9
Although the Komet court did not address the issue, it was certainly possible
that the Texas statute was vulnerable under traditional field preemption doc-
trine. Congress had clearly legislated in the field of creditors' claims in ER-
ISA's anti-alienation provision. While exemption of pension plans did not
present a case of implied conflict preemption like Georgia's prohibition of
garnishment of welfare benefits, it clearly encroached into an area regulated
by ERISA. Individual retirement accounts, however, are not protected by
the anti-alienation provision of ERISA and thus do not present a case for
either conflict or field preemption. The Komet court recognized this point in
its opinion on reconsideration and specifically noted in dicta that Texas's
exemption of IRAs would not be preempted.290
Within a year of the first decision finding preemption of Texas's exemp-
tion law, another Texas bankruptcy court reached the opposite conclusion.
The debtors in In re Volpe291 sought to exempt assets in both an ERISA-
qualified pension plan and an IRA. The bankruptcy court thoroughly ana-
lyzed Mackey and concluded that the Supreme Court "[had fallen] victim to
the allure of a well-turned phrase" with its broad statement that "state laws
which make 'reference to' ERISA plans are laws that 'relate to' those plans
within the meaning of § 514(a)."292 The holding in Mackey according to the
Volpe court -was that [the Georgia anti-garnishment statute], which sin-
gle[d] out ERISA employee welfare benefit plans for different treatment
under state garnishment procedures was in conflict with Congressional silence
as to the ability to garnish ERISA welfare benefit plans."293 Volpe anticipated
the change of direction in Travelers away from uncritical literalism toward
consideration of the structure and purpose of ERISA.294 While the Texas
statute clearly "referred to" ERISA, it did not "'have reference to' ERISA
plans" within the meaning of § 514(a).295 The Volpe court reached this con-
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989) (applying Texas law to ERISA-qualified plan), rev'd 119 B.R. 536 (S.D. Tex.
1990), affd 943 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. 1991).
259See supra text accompanying note 285.
290 The court does not have before it the question of Individual Retirement Accounts
and other devices which enjoy favorable tax treatment but are not governed by
ERISA. If these devices are not governed by ERISA, they are also not subject to
the pre-emption scheme of Section 514(a) .... Whether they are otherwise pro-
tected by ERISA is not before the court. See In re Laxson, 102 B.R 85 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 1989) (finding the Texas statute sufficient to protect such devices).
In re Komet, 104 BR. 799, 805 n.12 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989).
291100 B.R. 840 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989), affd 120 B.R. 843 (W.D. Tex. 1990), affd 943 F.2d 1451
(5th Cir. 1991).
.
92Id. at 848 (quoting Mackey, 486 U.S. at 829).
293Id.
294See supra text accompanying notes 171.86.
295Volpe, 100 B.R. at 848.
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clusion by focusing on the majority opinion in that part of Mackey that held
that ERISA did not preempt the entire Georgia garnishment system as it
applied to pension plans, from which it concluded:
I believe that [the Texas exemption statute] does not pur-
port to regulate the terms and conditions of an employee
benefit plan; it does not affect the relationship between the
principal ERISA entities. Any relationship to ERISA is sim-
ply too tenuous, remote or peripheral to "relate" within the
intendment of [ERISA § 514(a)]. 296
Texas's exemption statute thus fell within that 'narrow category of laws
which affect employee benefit plans but which do not relate to them within
the meaning of § 514(a). 297
While Volpe may have been prescient with regard to the purpose-driven
analysis ultimately adopted by the Supreme Court in Travelers, it failed to
work through the implications of field preemption. The opinion began with a
comprehensive analysis of Supreme Court preemption precedent but it ulti-
mately framed the scope of field preemption to "any state laws that 'relate to
any employee benefit plan.' "298 The breadth of field preemption scope al-
lowed the Volpe court to conflate its broad purpose-driven "relate to" analy-
sis of § 514(a) with what should have included the narrower question of the
conflict preemption effect of ERISA's anti-alienation provision.299
Even if the Texas exemption statute did not relate to an employee benefit
plan within the broad purposes of ERISA, the statute duplicated a specific
protection afforded by Congress for such plans. Given the unanimous holding
in Mackey preempting Georgia's garnishment exemption for welfare plan ben-
efits, it should have seemed plausible that the Supreme Court in its pre-Trav-
elers days would find preemption of an exemption for benefits of a pension
plan subject to ERISA. The Volpe court never reached the issue of whether
the exemption of IRAs presented a different question because it held that the
entirety of the Texas statute survived the creditor's assault. Doubts about
Texas's exemption for IRAs were addressed by another Texas bankruptcy
court only two months later.
2 9 6 1d. at 854-55.
297id. (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 679
F.2d 1307, 1312 (9th Cir. 1982)).29 SVolpe, 100 B.R. at 847.
299Volpe correctly noted that "state law which does not conflict with a positive Congressional enact-
ment in the common-sense sense .. .may nevertheless conflict with Congressional silence on a subject
which is within a field as to which Congress has reserved to itself the sole right to regulate . . . . Id. at
848. What Volpe failed to address was the preemptive effect of § 206. ERISA's explicit antialienation
provision with respect to pension plans does not raise the question of the meaning of congressional silence
as in Mackey; rather, it calls for consideration of the effect of express congressional action.
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The bankruptcy trustee objected to Joel Laxson's exemption of two IRAs
under the blended Texas statute in In re Laxson.300 Relying on Mackey, the
trustee asserted that ERISA preempted the exemption. 301 The court side-
stepped the preemption issue by correctly holding that Title I of ERISA as a
whole and, hence, § 514(a), simply did not apply to IRAs. "Since an IRA is
self-settled and not maintained by an employer or an organization, IRAs are
simply not the type of accounts that fall under the ERISA legislation." 30 2 An
exemption of IRAs is thus not preempted. While the Texas statute did not
limit or condition an IRA exemption with the existence of ERISA-qualified
plans, the bankruptcy court in Laxson addressed the issue of whether it could
sever the IRA exemption from the balance of the exemption statute that
pertained to qualified plans. Texas law provided a blanket direction to courts
to sever valid from invalid portions of statutes under most circumstances. 30 3
Without addressing preemption of the exemption for pension plans, Laxson
concluded that "the portions [of the exemption statute] that apply to non-
ERISA accounts can still be given effect." 3°4 Exempting IRAs, even in a stat-
ute otherwise subject to preemption, was not impaired by ERISA. Virginia,
like Texas, has a severability provision.30 5
Virginia's exemption for IRAs cannot simply be severed from its exemp-
tion for retirement benefits subject to ERISA. Integration of the amount of
benefits subject to ERISA with retirement savings in an IRA requires the
"102 BR. 85 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989).
3
°iId. at 85-86. ("The trustee's objection to the I.R.A's is based on the argument that the relevant
portion of the Texas Property Code is in fact preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA). In arriving at this conclusion, the trustee relies on Mackey.").
3021d. at 89 (citing ERISA §§ 3, 4 and 514). "[S]ince ERISA does not apply to IRAs, then ERISA
does not preempt the statute, with respect to IRAs or any other accounts not covered by the ERISA
statute." Id.
303 [T]he Texas Code Construction Act provides: (c) in a statute that does not con-
tain a provision for severability or nonseverability, if any provision of the statute or
its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not
affect other provisions or applications of the statute that can be given effect with-
out the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of the statute
are severable.
Id. at 89 (quoting TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.032 (Vernon 1988)).
3041d.
305 The provisions of statutes in this Code or the application thereof to any person or
circumstances which are held invalid shall not affect the validity of other statutes,
provisions or applications of this Code which can be given effect without the inva-
lid provisions or applications. The provisions of all statutes are severable unless (i)
the statute specifically provides that its provisions are not severable; or (ii) it is
apparent that two or more statutes or provisions must operate in accord with one
another.
VA. CODE ANN. § 1-17.1 (Michie Supp. 2002). Most states have such a statute. See Michael C. Dorf,
Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REv. 235 (1994). See supra text accompany-
ing note 303 for Texas's statute.
AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL
court to take notice of the ERISA benefits. Yet the process of integration
has no effect on the retirement plan or on its administration. Nor does inte-
gration subject plan administrators to disparate state mandates. Finally, un-
like Boggs, the result of integration does not potentially reduce the amount of
benefits subject to ERISA that the debtor will receive. While integration
runs afoul of the broad language in Ingersoll-Rand, it does not present an
actual conflict with an exclusive ERISA enforcement provision and is not
inconsistent with the holding in Ingersoll-Rand.
4. Would ERISA § 514(a) Although the conclusion is not
preempt a state statute integrating free from doubt, the combination
the amount of the exemption for of statutory severance and the
IRAs with the amount of assets in purpose-driven analysis of
retirement plans subject to Travelers support an answer of
ERISA? no.
B. CONSISTENCY AMONG THE COURTS OF APPEALS
Notwithstanding the divergent conclusions reached in the bankruptcy
courts, the Circuit Courts of Appeals that have considered preemption of
blended laws exempting ERISA-qualified pension plans and IRAs have
achieved a remarkable degree of consistency. Only the Ninth Circuit in Pi-
trat v. Garlikov306 held in a 2-1 decision that ERISA preempted a state law
exemption for assets held in a qualified retirement plan. But the court later
withdrew its first opinion 307 and its subsequent decision did not address the
preemption issue. 308 Patterson v. Shumate mooted the specific holdings in all
these cases. Yet their reasoning remains relevant. If an exemption of IRAs in
conjunction with retirement plans subject to ERISA is preempted, then only
§ 514(d) will save them. In Virginia, only the District Court in Bottoms has
addressed this issue. 30 9 Thus the following cases remain important when ad-
dressing an integrative statute like § 34-34.
At virtually the same time as the release of the Ninth Circuit's decision
in Pitrat, the Fifth Circuit in Heitkamp v. Dyke (In re Dyke) 310 held that
Texas's blended exemption statute was saved by ERISA § 514(d) - the sav-
ings clause. The Fifth Circuit was not persuaded by the reasoning in Volpe
306947 F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1991). Judge Sneed based his dissent on ERISA's savings clause and the
Supreme Court's decision in Shaw: -To my mind, AR.S. § 33-1126(B) is the equivalent of those portions
of the New York Human Rights Law that the Court saved in Shaw, not those it preempted." Id. at 432.
5
°
7Pitrat v. Garlikov, 981 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1992).
3
°sPitrat v. Garlikov, 992 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1993). The preemption issue had been mooted by the
intervening Supreme Court decision in Patterson v. Shumate.
3
°gSee supra text accompanying notes 249-62.
30943 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. 1991).
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that the Supreme Court's "make reference to" language in Mackey should be
interpreted purposefully. 31, It took the Court's summary of its holding liter-
ally and concluded that the Texas exemption statute fell within the scope of
ERISA preemption because of its direct references to ERISA.31 2 Yet the
court was willing to apply Shaw's treatment of New York's Human Rights
Law - that "under certain circumstances ERISA also does not preempt state
laws which enforce federal goals" 31 3 - to the exemption statute because the
Bankruptcy Code implemented a federal policy of a "fresh start" for debtors
and the statute advanced that policy. 314 The court was particularly im-
pressed that the exemption statute would achieve the same goal as Bank-
ruptcy Code § 522(d)(10)(E) - preservation of an amount necessary for the
debtor's support in retirement. 315
The Eighth Circuit reached the same conclusion the following year in
Checkett v. Vickers (In re Vickers).3 16 Missouri had opted out of the federal
bankruptcy exemptions317 but had enacted an exemption for a variety of re-
311 The language in Mackey is different from the language in Shaw.... Some commen-
tators have argued that the language in Mackey expands ERISA's preemptive effect
beyond that which the Court anticipated in Shaw . . . see also In re Volpe ("it
appears that the Supreme Court [in Mackey] fell victim to the allure of a well-
turned phrase .... I submit that there is a difference, if not a vast difference,
between 'makes reference to' and 'has reference to.'"). Regardless whether Mackey
expanded the rule in Shaw, however, the rule in Mackey is the most recent pro-
nouncement of the Supreme Court, and this Court is required to follow it.
Heitkamp, 943 F.2d 1435, 1448 n.33 (citations omitted).
1i2Id. at 1448 (-The Shaw 'exception' - that ERISA does not preempt state laws which affect benefit
plans in a tenuous or peripheral manner - applies only to laws of general application; it does not protect
state laws which specifically refer to ERISA benefit plans.").
33Is8. at 1449.
314 The Bankruptcy Code, in particular, is a federal law that ERISA cannot disturb.
The Texas legislature has created a state exemption scheme that advances the prin-
cipal goal of the Bankruptcy Code. One such exemption in this state scheme, sec-
tion 42.0021(a) of the Texas Property Code, permits bankrupt debtors to exempt
the funds in their retirement plans. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.0021(a) (Vernon
Supp. 1991). If the ERISA preemption clause is enforced against section 42.002 1(a),
the preemption clause would impair the ability of the Bankruptcy Code to ensure -
through the Texas state exemption scheme - that Texas debtors can get a "fresh
start" after bankruptcy. Accordingly, this Court concludes that ERISA section
514(d) saves the Texas state exemption scheme from preemption. ERISA does not
preempt section 42.0021(a) of the Texas Property Code.
Id. at 1450 (citations omitted).
31 This section serves the same purpose as section 522(d)(10)(E) of the Bankruptcy
Code: both provisions permit debtors to claim exemptions for their retirement ben-
efits... Because the Texas statute does not permit an exemption that the Bank-
ruptcy Code prohibits - or vice versa - we conclude that ERISA does not preempt
section 42.0021(a).
316954 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir. 1992).
"iSId. at 1429 (-The [bankruptcy] code also allows states to opt out and create their own exemp-
tions .... The State of Missouri has exercised this option.") (citations omitted).
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tirement benefits identical to Bankruptcy Code § 522(d)(10)(E). 318  The
opinion raised the question of whether ERISA preempted the statute in the
first instance. 319 Taking the easier road, however, the Vickers court had no
difficulty in saving Missouri's exemption statute, noting that "[i]t would be
incongruous to hold pension benefits exempted under the federal bankruptcy
law, but to strike down identical provisions enacted by the state under the
express authorization of the bankruptcy code."320
A year later in Schlein v. Mills (In re Schlein) the Eleventh Circuit held
that ERISA § 514(d) saved Florida's exemption statute. 321 Florida too had
opted out of the federal exemptions322 but in an interesting twist had saved
itself the trouble of enacting anything substantive with regard to pension
assets by opting back into Bankruptcy Code § 522(d)(10)(E) by incorporat-
ing it by reference. 323 The Schlein court took Mackey at its word - any law
that makes reference to ERISA relates to ERISA - and held that the Florida
exemption statute "relates to ERISA benefit plans and, absent an applicable
exception, is preempted by ERISA § 514(a)."324 The Eleventh Circuit panel
conducted a thorough analysis of Shaw and looked at the precedent in Pitrat,
Dyke, and Vickers and concluded that the exemption statute was saved:
31
81d. at 1428. (Missouri law allows a bankruptcy debtor to exempt
(10) Such person's right to receive:
(e) A payment under a stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing, annuity or similar plan
or contract on account of illness, disability, death, age or length of service, to the
extent reasonably necessary for the support of such person and any dependent of
such person unless:
Such plan or contract was established by or under the auspices of an insider
that employed such person at the time such person's rights under such plan
or contract arose;
Such payment is on account of age or length of service; and
Such plan or contract does not qualify under section 401(a), 403(a), 403(b),
408 or 409 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. 401(a), 403(a),
403(b), 408 or 409).
Mo. Rav. STAT. § 513.430(10)(e) (Supp. 1991).
3191d. (-We do not read the congressional preemption under section 1144(a) as broadly as the
trustee.").
3201d. at 1429.
32i 8 F.3d 745 (l1th Cir. 1993).
1
22Id. at 748 (-Fla. Stat. § 220.20 establishes the general nonavailability of the federal bankruptcy
exemptions under 11 U.S.C. § 522.").
323FLA. STAT. § 222.201 then opts the state back in as far as exemptions in Bankruptcy Code § 522
(d)(10) are concerned:
Notwithstanding § 222.20, an individual debtor under the federal Bankruptcy Re-
form Act of 1978 may exempt, in addition to any other exemptions allowed under
state law, any property listed in subsection (d)(10) of § 522 of that act.
Id. at 749.
3241d. at 750.
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A holding that state exemption statutes like the one in-
volved in this case are preempted would alter, amend, or
modify the Bankruptcy Code's provision permitting states to
set exemptions and the deliberate policy choices of Congress
that underlie that provision. We do not believe that Con-
gress intended that result. Accordingly, we hold that Fla.
Stat. § 222.21(2)(a) is not preempted by ERISA.3 25
After considerable tumult at the bankruptcy court level, three of the
Courts of Appeals that have addressed the issue of ERISA and state exemp-
tion laws have concluded that ERISA § 514(d) saves them from preemption.
The opinion reflecting the only exception to this trend has been withdrawn.
None of the Circuit Court decisions held that ERISA did not preempt the
exemption laws in the first place although Vickers left open that possibility.
Nonetheless, none of the Circuit Courts confronted an exemption statute as
abstruse as Virginia's. While the weight of authority seems clearly to sup-
port the District Court's decision in Bottoms, all of the Circuit Court opin-
ions predate Travelers. The decision in Travelers has reduced the need to
rely on ERISA § 514(d) in most cases. The purpose-driven preemption anal-
ysis of Travelers certainly bolsters the bankruptcy court's decision in Gurry.
Coupled with the application of § 514(d) in Bottoms and the conclusion of no
preemption in Gurry, the integrative formula of § 34-34(H) remains applica-
ble to debtors in Virginia.
5. If the answer to any of these
questions were yes, would Although not free from doubt,the unanimous weight of§ 514(d) save such a state statute authority suggests yes.
from preemption? I I
CONCLUSION
The Virginia legislature's initial efforts to protect retirement assets in
1990 spoke simply: the total of protected benefits could not exceed the
amount necessary to produce a modest income stream upon retirement. Prior
to the 1992 decision in Patterson v. Shumate, there was every reason for
lawmakers to consider all retirement plans together. As long as both ERISA-
qualified plans and IRAs remained in the bankruptcy estate, there was no
reason to treat separately assets whose purposes were substantially similar.
Section 34-34(B) thus provided for integration of pension and IRA assets to
produce a reasonable and calculable stream of retirement income. Although
1
251d. at 753-54. See also Abbate, 289 B.R. at 70 ("This court finds Schlein's reasoning persuasive and
holds that § 34-34 is not preempted by ERISA.").
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the battle over ERISA preemption of state exemptions of pension plans sub-
ject to ERISA had been joined the preceding year, its ultimate results re-
mained murky. None of the Circuit Courts of Appeals were to issue a
decision until a year after Virginia's first exemption of retirement assets. The
Joint Committee was aware of the potential for ERISA preemption but cor-
rectly anticipated that many courts would hold that ERISA § 514(d) is an
effective tool to save such an exemption.
With the Patterson decision, much of the impetus for pension exemptions
dissipated. Yet the jarring disparity between treatment of ERISA-qualified
plans and IRAs occasioned by Patterson called for some legislative response.
The restricted right to exempt certain retirement savings appeared unfair
when contrasted with the unlimited right to keep other retirement assets.
Virginia's response in 1999 created a conditional unlimited exemption for
IRAs. By itself such an unlimited exemption would raise no preemption
problems. The unlimited exemption for IRAs in § 34-34(H) does not, how-
ever, stand alone; it is conditioned on the debtor's failure to claim an "exemp-
tion" for retirement plans subject to ERISA.
The Bissell court concluded ERISA would preempt the entire exemption
scheme for all retirement assets including IRAs unless the express language of
§ 34-34(A) were read not to include benefits subject to ERISA. The court
strained to construe language on its face defining "retirement plans" to in-
clude ones subject to ERISA to exclude such plans. Bissell warped the con-
struction of-§ 34-34(A) only because it applied Mackey mechanically; it did
not consider Mackey's holding but woodenly applied the Court's statement of
its conclusion. The additional failure to consider the adjustment in preemp-
tion analysis effected by Travelers further distorted Bissell's construction of
the exemption statute to lead to a result clearly not intended by the Virginia
legislature. The initial legislative goal in 1990 was to provide a limited ex-
emption for all retirement benefits. The 1999 amendments recognized the
effect of Patterson v. Shumate and equalized the treatment of IRAs and ER-
ISA-qualified plans but only if the debtor did not seek to protect both sorts
of retirement assets. Newly added §34-34(H) allowed for unlimited exemp-
tion of IRAs or plans subject to ERISA but not both. Bissell effectively
allows a debtor to keep both and justifies its conclusion on the ground that to
hold otherwise would lead to no exemption at all for IRAs.
The Bankruptcy Code certainly authorizes debtors to use state law ex-
emptions although it nowhere requires that states provide them.326 Like
326 [N]othing in the Bankruptcy Code would prevent a state from denying its re-
sidents the benefits of the federal bankruptcy exemption, by exercising its option to
opt out of the federal scheme, and simultaneously abolishing all state exemptions -
leaving a debtor with no exemptions whatsoever except those created under federal
nonbankruptcy law.
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New York's Disability Benefits Law addressed in Shaw, mere consistency
with the bankruptcy policy of the fresh start is not enough to fit an other-
wise preempted exemption statute into ERISA § 514(d). Unlike the New
York Human Rights Law that was saved from preemption in Shaw, the exis-
tence of state exemptions does not relieve a federal administrative body of a
substantial portion of its workload. 327 Yet congruence in result between
§ 34-34 and the Bankruptcy Code § 522(d)(10)(E) cannot be ignored. The
police power of the states includes the power to enact exemption laws and
the Bankruptcy Code § 522(b) specifically authorizes debtors to use such
laws. As long as exemption laws exist they are part of the Bankruptcy Code
and thus are protected from preemption by § 514(d).
While Gurry's conclusion that ERISA does not preempt Virginia's ex-
emption law is consistent with post-Mackey Supreme Court jurisprudence,
the opinion fails to come to grips with Travelers and its progeny. Mackey
held that ERISA preempted Georgia's prohibition of garnishment of welfare
plan benefits because Congress had chosen to protect only pension plan bene-
fits. Georgia's statute thus intruded into a field tacitly occupied by ERISA.
By way of contrast, IRAs are neither welfare plans nor pension plans. Ex-
emption of IRAs is no more within the field of ERISA than is exemption of
the family Bible. 328 Travelers clarified the "relate to" aspect of Mackey's
holding and even expanded the sorts of state activities that fell outside the
field of ERISA. In Mackey, a law of general application like garnishment was
not preempted simply because it could be applied to plans governed by ER-
ISA. With Travelers, schemes of reimbursement and, according to DeBuono,
even taxation resulting in differential costs to plans subject to ERISA are not
preempted. Exemption of IRAs even when integrated with assets not cov-
ered by ERISA does not warrant different treatment.
Nevertheless, neither Travelers nor any subsequent case has expressly
overruled the "refer to" test of preemption. Three reasons militate against
application of this test to the exemption of IRAs. First, the state statute
intruded into the field of ERISA in each case where a state statute referring
to ERISA was preempted.3 29 Second, given the holdings of the Court's deci-
In re Vanmeter, 137 B.R. 908, 917 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1992).
327Virginia's exemption law does provide a bankruptcy court with a simple formula for determining
the "amount reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor" in the words of Bankruptcy Code
§ 522(d)(1O)(E). Even this limited reduction in judicial discretion might benefit the court and debtors by
reducing judicial and litigation expenses; in any event, it apparently struck the Virginia legislature as
appropriate.525See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 34-26(1) (Michie Supp. 2002).
329 [S]ome statutes that refer to covered plans do not have an effect on covered plans,
and others have only a tenuous, remote, or peripheral effect. Both of these types of
state laws fall outside the scope of ERISA pre-emption. Other statutes do not refer
to ERISA but nonetheless have an effect on a covered plan; these are pre-empted
2003)
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sions since Travelers, the Court has signaled that it is engaging in traditional
field preemption analysis regardless of the terminology employed. Finally, the
"refer to" test is not grounded in the text of ERISA § 514(a). ERISA does
not employ this term; it is simply a gloss used by the Court to explain its
conclusion in a particular case - it should not be a reason for other courts to
act.
Virginia's exemption for IRAs refers to ERISA at multiple points. Its
definition of retirement plans includes ones subject to ERISA as well as those
not governed by ERISA. It conditions an unlimited exemption for IRAs on
the absence of a plan subject to ERISA. It requires calculation of the extent
of exemption for an IRA with a formula in which assets in a plan subject to
ERISA play a part. Yet in all of these respects § 34-34 neither impacts on
plan design or administration thwarts a goal of ERISA nor intrudes into a
field governed by ERISA. Section 34-34 therefore does not relate to ERISA
within the meaning of § 514(a). It thus follows that the many laws merely
blending exemptions for IRAs with exemptions of pensions subject to ERISA
will likewise not be preempted.
because they have more than a tenuous, remote, or peripheral effect. What unites
the "refers to" and "connection with" definitions of "relates to" then is that both
were crafted to get at statutes that have an effect on ERISA plans. Consequently,
statutes that refer to ERISA, but have no effect on a covered plan, are not within
the scope of the definition of relates to and, as such, are not pre-empted.
Thiokol, 76 F.3d 751, 759 (6th Cir. 1996).
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Appendix
State Statutory Exemptions for Individual Retirement Accounts
Judicial
Exemption for Reference Decisions on
Pension Assets to Reference ERISA
and/or Benefits ERISA to IRC Preemption of
Jurisdiction Statutory Reference (+/-) (+/-) (+/-) IRA Exemption
Alabama
ALASKA STAT.
Alaska §§ 09.38.017(a)(1), + + +
(e)(3) (Michie
2002).
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Determined on
Arizona ANN. § 33-126(c) + + + a case by case
(West 2002). basis 3 30
ARK. CODE ANN.
Arkansas § 16-66-220(a)(1) + + +
(Michie Supp.
2001).
CAL. CIV. PROC.
California CODE § 18016)(5) + + +(West Supp.
2003).
COLO. REV. STAT.
Colorado ANN. § 13-54- + + +
102(s) (West Supp.
2002).
CONN. GEN. STAT.
Connecticut ANN. § 52-321a + + +
(West Supp. 2002).
DEL. CODE ANN.
Delaware tit. 10, § 4915 + + +
(1999).
District of D.C. CODE ANN.
Columbia § 15-501(a)(7) to + + +(9) (2001).
FLA. STAT. ANN.
Florida § 222.21 (West + + + Not
Supp. 2003). preempted3 3 '
GA. CODE ANN.
Georgia § 44-13- + +
100(a)(2)(E)-(F)
(2002).
Hawaii HAW. REV. STAT. + + +§ 651-124 (2000). 1 1 1
3
"°See In re Bharucha, 115 B.R. 671 (Bankr. D. Az. 1990) (holding that because the IRAs were
established and maintained by the debtors individually, the state law exemption was not preempted by
ERISA). The court also held that 'whether an IRA, or any other type of pension, is within ERISA must
thus be determined from application of federal law to the facts of each case. The operative test contained
in [29 U.S.C.S.] section 1003(a) focuses on how the plan is established or maintained." Id. at 673.
3
'See, e.g., In re Groff, 234 BR. 153 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999) (holding that "Florida Statute
§ 222.21(2)(a) does apply to IRAs and has not been preempted by ERISA"); see also, Schlein v. Mills (In
re Schlein), 8 F.3d 745 (lth Cir. 1993); In re Francisco, 204 BR. 799 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996); In re
Suarez, 127 B.R. 73 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991).
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IDAHO CODE § 55-
Idaho 1011(1) (Michie + + +
2001).
735 ILL. COMP. Not
Illinois STAT. ANN. 5/12- + + + preempted 3 3 2
1006 (West 2002). preempted332
IND. CODE ANN.
Indiana § 34-55-10-2 +
(Michie 1998).
IOWA CODE ANN.
Iowa § 627.6 (West + + +
Supp. 2002)
KAN. STAT. ANN
Kansas § 60-2308(b) (Supp. + + +
2001).
Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 427.150(0 + + +
Kentucky (Michie Supp.
2002).
LA. REV. STAT.
Louisiana ANN.+§ 13:3881D(3)
(West Supp. 2003).
ME. REV. STAT.
Maine ANN. tit. 14, + + +
§ 4422-13 (West
2002).
MD. CODE ANN.,
Maryland CTS. & JUD. PROC. + + +
§ 11-504(h) (2002).
MASS. ANN. LAWS
Massachusetts ch. 235, § 34A + + + Not
(Law. Co-op. preempted 3 3 3
2000).
MICH COMP.
Michigan LAWS
§ 600.6023(1)(k) + + +
(2001).
MINN. STAT. ANN.
Minnesota § 550.37 subd. 24 +
(West Supp. 2003).
MISS. CODE ANN.
Mississippi § 85-3-1 (Supp. + + + Preempted3 3 4
2002).
3 3 2 See, e.g., In re Kazi, 125 B.R. 981 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1991) ((holding that where a IRA is a self settled
retirement account and not maintained by an employer or organization, it is outside the scope of ERISA
and therefore, not preempted); see also Nat'l Bank v. Multi Nat'l Indus., 678 N.E.2d 7 (I11. App. Ct. 1997);
In re Templeton, 146 B.R. 757 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992).
333See, e.g., In re Printy, 171 B.R. 448 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) (ERISA preemption does not apply as an
IRA is a self-settled account and therefore outside of the scope of ERISA).
534See, e.g., In re McLeod, 102 B.R. 60, 64 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1989). Under Miss. CODE § 85-3-
1(1)(b)(iii), there is no exemption provided for any pension fund unless it is an ERISA qualified plan.
Therefore, "the debtor may not claim exemptions under this section whether the pension plans are
qualified under ERISA or not." Id. Mississippi is somewhat unique as it expressly as includes IRAs as an
ERISA qualified asset. Id.
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Mo. ANN. STAT.
Missouri § 513.430 (West + + + Not
2002) preempted 335
MONT. CODE
Montana ANN. § 31-2-106(3) + + +
(2001).
NEB. REV. STAT.
Nebraska § 25-1563.01 + + +
(Supp. 2000).
Nevada NEV. REV. STAT. + + +
21.090(1)(q) (2001).
New No personal
Hampshire exemptions
NJ. Stat. Ann. any personal Not
New Jersey § 2A:17-19 (West property up to preempted 3 3 6
2000). $1,000 preempted___
any personal
N.M. STAT. ANN. prop. up to
New Mexico .§ 42-10,10 (Michie $2000
Supp. 1999). provided no
homestead
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5205 Not
New York (Consol. Supp. + + + Not
2002). preempted 3 3 7
North N.C. GEN. STAT.
Carolina § 1C-1601(a)(9) + +(2001).
N.D. CENT. CODE
North Dakota § 28-22-03.1 (Supp. + + +
2001).
ONJo REV. CODE
ANN. § Not
2329.66(A)(10) preempted 3 38
(2001).
OKLA. STAT. ANN.
Oklahoma tit. 31, § 1.A.20 + + + Not
(West Supp. 2003). preempted 3 3 9
Oregon OR. REV STAT. + + +§ 23.170 (2001). + + +
.
3 See, e.g., LaBarge v. Mehra (In re Mehra), 166 BR. 393 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1994) (holding that
because an IRA is a self settled and established account, it is outisde the preemptive scope of ERISA).
336See, e.g., Bank v. Schwartz (In re Schwartz), 185 B.R. 479 (Bankr. D. NJ. 1995) (holding that an
IRA is a self settled account established under the IRC and therefore not subject to ERISA preemption).
337See, e.g., In re Mann, 134 BR. 710 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that funds that had been rolled
over from an ERISA plan to an IRA were not subject to ERISA as state law permitted an exemption for
IRAs); see also Abrahams v. New York State Tax Comm'n, 500 N.Y.S.2d 965 (App. Div. 1986)
(establishing that an IRA will also be exempt if it is created in trust of or for the benefit of another); Long
Island Jewish Hillside Med. Ctr. v. Prendergast, 509 N.Y.S.2d 697 (App. Div. 1986); Joint Venture
Acquisition v. Misra, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12708 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 1992).
3
"See, e.g., In re Buzza, 287 B.R. 417 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2002) (holding that because IRAs are self
settled retirement account they are beyong the scope of ERISA and thus not preempted); In re Fixel, 286
B.R. 638 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2002); In re Mitchell, No. 02-13713, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 1217 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio Oct. 31, 2002).
339See In re Ree, 114 B.R. 286 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990) (finding that IRAs are not preempted or
rendered void by ERISA); In re Ridgway, 108 B.R. 294 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1989).
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42 PA. CONS.
Pennsylvania STAT. ANN.§ 8124 (West ± + +
Supp. 2002).
R.I. GEN. LAWS
Rhode Island §§ 9-26-4(11), (12) + + +
(Supp. 2002).
S.C. CoDE ANN.
South §§ 15-41-30(12), + + +
Carolina (13) (Law. Coop
Supp. 2002).
S.D. CODIFIED
South Dakota LAWS §§ 43-45-15, + + +
-17 (1997 & Supp.
2002).
TENN. CODE ANN. Not
Tennessee § 26-2-105(b) + + + preempted 34"
(Supp. 2002) .340
TEX. PROP. CODE Not
Texas ANN. § 42.0021 + + + preempted 34 2
(Vernon 2000).
UTAH CODE ANN.Utah § 78 -23-5(j) (2002). + + +
VT. STAT. ANN.
Vermont tit. 12, § 2740(16) + + +
(2002).
VA. CODE ANN. Not
Virginia § 34-34 (Michie + + + preempted3 4 3
Supp. 2002).
WASH REv. CODE Not
Washington ANN. § 6.15.020 + + + preempted3 4 4
(West Supp. 2003).
W. VA. CODE
West ANN. § 38-10-4 + + +
Virginia (Michie Supp.
2002).
34
'Transferred to TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26-2-105 in 2000.
341See, e.g., In re Martin, 102 B.R. 639 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1989) (holding that IRAs are exempt under
Tennessee law because they are self settled accounts that are entered into voluntarily and because no
contributions are made by an employer).
342See In re Dyke, 943 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that although Texas courts have had mixed
results when ruling on ERISA preemption, that § 42.0021(a) is not preempted by ERISA because it
would impair the Bankruptcy Code's purpose to provide a "fresh start" post-bankruptcy). For a survey of
Texas caselaw illustrative of mixed results see, e.g., In re Felts, 114 B.R. 131 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990)
(ERISA does preempt § 42.0021(a)), revd, No. A-90-CA-364 (W.D. Tex. July 30, 1990); In re Komet, 104
B.R. 799 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989) (ERISA preemption); In re Volpe, 100 BR. 840 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1989 (ERISA does not preempt § 42.0021(a)); In re Laxson, 102 B.R. 85 ( Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989 (No
ERISA preemption of IRAs).
343 Phillips v. Bottoms, 260 BR. 393 (E.D. Va. 2000) (holding that while an IRA is part of the
Debtors' estate, § 34-34 of the Virginia Code, even though theoretically preempted by section 514(a) of
ERISA, is saved from preemption by section 514(d) of ERISA); In re Bissell, 255 B.R. 402 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 2000); In re Gurry, 253 B.R. 406 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2000).
34 4See, e.g., Atkinson v. Nelson (In re Nelson), 180 B.R. 584 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) (ERISA does not
preempt state law with respect to IRAs because an IRA does not fall within the definition of "employee
benefit plan.").
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